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Volume I: Technical Assessment Report 
1.0 Notification and Authorization  
In October 2008, Mr. Steve Altemus, Director of Engineering at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
requested an independent assessment of the Constellation Program (CxP) Crew Exploration 
Vehicle (CEV) Parachute Assembly System (CPAS).  Mr. Altemus requested the NASA 
Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) create a cross-Agency and multidiscipline team to 
examine the following: 
 Review the current CPAS‘s design, reliability estimates, and development test plans 
 Identify design improvement opportunities to increase the overall CPAS reliability 
 Identify improvements to the development test plan (revisions, additions, or deletions) 
that will improve its efficiency and effectiveness 
 Identify process improvement opportunities to increase the overall CPAS reliability 
An NESC out-of-board activity was approved by Mr. Ralph Roe, the NESC Director, on  
October 22, 2008.  Mr. Michael Kelly, NESC Back-Up Principal Engineer at Langley Research 
Center (LaRC), was selected to lead this assessment.  The assessment plan was approved by the 
NESC Review Board (NRB) on November 20, 2008.  The assessment plan was subsequently 
updated and approved by the NRB on March 26, 2009, and August 20, 2009.     
The key stakeholders for this assessment were the CxP CPAS Systems Engineering and 
Integration (SE&I) lead, Mr. Timothy Fisher; the CPAS Chief Engineer, Mr. Ricardo ―Koki‖ 
Machin; and the CPAS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) lead, Ms. Christine Stewart. 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
08-00487 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
CEV Parachute Assembly System Independent  
Design Reliability Assessment 
Page #: 
8 of 109 
 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-08-00487 
2.0 Signature Page 
 
Submitted by:  
 
Team Signature Page on File – 11/12/10 
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Dr. Vance L. Behr   Date  Mr. Douglas C. Brown  Date 
 
 
 
Mr. John E. Hengel    Date  Mr. Michael Herr   Date 
 
 
 
Mr. Jerry E. McCullough  Date  Dr. Peter A. Parker   Date 
 
 
 
Mr. Jeremy D. Shidner   Date  Mr. Robert B. West   Date  
 
              
 
Dr. James M. Womack  Date  Mr. Gary K. Won   Date 
 
 
 
Signatories declare the findings and observations compiled in the report are factually based from 
data extracted from Program/Project documents, contractor reports, and open literature, and/or 
generated from independently conducted tests, analysis, and inspections.    
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Karma Snyder 
Test Engineering and Systems 
Engineering 
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Walter Thomas Reliability and Statistics  GSFC 
Tricia Johnson MTSO Program Analyst LaRC 
Contractors 
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*Team members participated for less than the full term of the assessment. 
3.1 Acknowledgements   
The NESC assessment team would like to acknowledge and thank members of the entire CPAS 
organization including NASA, Jacobs Engineering and Science Contract Group (Jacobs ESCG), 
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Burgess easily managed two schedule changes and an assessment hiatus.  Special thanks are 
given to ATK Technical Writer Ms. Carolyn Snare for her tremendous help getting three interim 
stakeholder outbriefs and one final stakeholder outbrief completed on time, and not least for 
getting this two-volume final report completed and with excellent appearance. 
The considerable effort and quality feedback provided by three peer reviewers, Mr. Steven 
Gentz, Mr. Daniel Yuchnovicz, and Mr. Kenneth Johnson, are also acknowledged with 
tremendous gratitude. 
The assessment team leader wishes to thank the entire assessment team for the amazing 
education he received in parachute design development and reliability methodology.    
  
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
08-00487 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
CEV Parachute Assembly System Independent  
Design Reliability Assessment 
Page #: 
11 of 109 
 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-08-00487 
4.0 Executive Summary 
4.1  Summary of Assessment 
This report documents the activities, findings, and NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
(NESC) recommendations of a multidiscipline team to independently assess the Constellation 
Program (CxP) Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Parachute Assembly System (CPAS).  This 
assessment occurred during a period of 15 noncontiguous months between December 2008 and 
April 2010, prior to the CPAS Project‘s Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in August 2010.   
The assessment team‘s planned objectives were to identify reliability-enhancing opportunities for 
the CPAS Project:  
 Parachute system design 
 Reliability estimation methodologies 
 Development program (development tests and analysis, and verification plans) 
 Design development and integration practices   
The assessment team‘s activities were divided into three review periods (RPs).  Each RP began 
with an Internal Design Review (IDR) and concluded with a stakeholder summary (originally 
titled stakeholder outbrief) of findings, observations, and interim NESC recommendations.  
RP-1 December 2008–March 2009 
RP-2 April 2009–May 2009 and July–August 2009 
RP-3 September 2009–April 2010 
Prior to 2008, the CPAS architecture (referred to as the ―Generation-1‖ (Gen-1) architecture) 
included two mortar-deployed drogue parachutes and three mortar-deployed pilot parachutes; 
each pilot parachute deployed a main parachute.  The concept of operations (Con Ops) had the 
crew module‘s (CM‘s) forward bay cover (FBC) jettisoning as the first event, prior to firing the 
drogue mortars.  
During 2008, the CPAS architecture was modified such that the initiating event was the mortar-
deployment of the two drogue parachutes through holes in the FBC.  The drogues were to share a 
common, three-legged harness that was stowed externally on top of the FBC.  Subsequent 
jettison of the FBC would deploy three main parachutes attached to its underside by virtue of the 
separation event.  This was the CPAS‘s architecture when the NESC team began its assessment. 
During the assessment, the Project considered, studied, adopted, and discarded numerous 
architectural options.  These are described in detail in Section 6.3 and assessed in Section 7.2.1.  
By the end of the assessment, the final ―Generation-2‖ (Gen-2) architecture had been selected 
and work was proceeding toward the Project‘s PDR in August 2010.  This architecture 
resembled the Apollo Program Earth Landing System (ELS), with two mortar-deployed drogue 
parachutes, three mortar-deployed pilot parachutes, and three pilot-parachute-deployed main 
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parachutes.  Drogue and main parachute risers were attached to the CM at a common location 
and were steel rather than textile. 
During the assessment, the Project‘s fault tree analysis (FTA) and probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) also changed considerably, commensurate with the architecture changes (as detailed in 
Section 6.4 and assessed in Section 7.2.2).  The requirements and development plans also 
evolved with the architecture (as detailed in Section 6.5 and assessed in Section 7.2.3). 
The NESC assessment team outbriefed findings, observations, and interim NESC 
recommendations to the Project at the end of each RP.  In all, 55 interim NESC 
recommendations were provided.  Most of these were acted upon in part or in whole by the 
Project during the assessment period or were overcome by ongoing Project design decisions.  
Some interim NESC recommendations from the third RP are reiterated as final recommendations 
in this report.  (See Appendices B, C, and D for a complete list of interim NESC 
recommendations.) 
This final report provides findings, observations, and nine final NESC recommendations that 
pertain to the Gen-2 CPAS architecture.  All are reiterations or enhanced restatements of 
previously approved interim NESC recommendations that were of the top-most concern to the 
assessment team at the conclusion of its assessment. 
Two final NESC recommendations pertain to the architecture itself.  The assessment team 
reiterates an interim recommendation that the Project should establish a formal volume budget 
for managing parachute growth throughout the development effort and even after Orion becomes 
operational.  The assessment team also recommends that the Orion Project comprehensively 
reevaluate the many integrated issues that arise from the reliance on a CM roll reorientation 
maneuver just prior to water landings.  Both of these issues may impact CPAS reliability. 
The assessment team makes two final NESC recommendations pertaining to the PRA.  One 
recommends the preferential use of certain data over others for probability failure estimates, and 
the other restates an interim recommendation about conveyance of data sources and uncertainties 
when PRA results are communicated to decision makers. 
The assessment team presents one final NESC recommendation on requirements planning and 
restates another recommendation regarding the utility of statistical design-of-experiment (DOE) 
techniques for planning an effective and efficient development program. 
The assessment team collected several findings about risk associated with specific design details 
in the Gen-2 architecture.  They combined them in one final NESC recommendation for specific 
near-term ground tests to provide information that will enable the Project to make more informed 
design decisions.   
One other interim recommendation is reiterated regarding the conveyance of the validity and 
uncertainty associated with analytical results when they are communicated to decision makers.   
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
08-00487 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
CEV Parachute Assembly System Independent  
Design Reliability Assessment 
Page #: 
13 of 109 
 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-08-00487 
Finally, an NESC recommendation is made for the application of DOE to a comprehensively 
planned verification effort to assure CPAS matures as a robust, reliable system.   
4.2 Apollo Program Reports 
A significant recurrent observation of the assessment team was that the Project‘s PRA lacked 
sufficient appropriate data on which to base failure probability estimates (see Section 7.2.2 for 
more details).  The assessment team found that a key early estimate was inappropriately based on 
Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) service data.  Later, the Project 
applied data from an expert elicitation (EE) exercise with which the assessment team found 
shortcomings.  With the final Gen-2 architecture now resembling the Apollo Program ELS in 
many ways, the assessment team concluded that applicable data from Apollo tests would be of 
tremendous utility.  Unfortunately, many of the contractor reports generated during ELS 
development could not be located within NASA.  This revelation led the assessment team to 
create an Agency lesson learned that NASA Programs and Projects should not rely on contractor 
reports surviving but rather should document development efforts themselves and store the 
documentation in a topic-specific or discipline-specific Agency repository. 
During the assessment period, a cache of parachute testing and reliability reports from the now-
defunct Northrop Ventura company was discovered in a Northrop Grumman (NG) document 
storage facility.  A contract with NG was funded with assessment budget to allow a retired 
(Rockwell) expert on heritage Apollo parachute testing (not an assessment team member), who 
had first-hand knowledge of these reports, to conduct two surveys to inventory these reports at 
the storage facility in August and December 2009.  The assessment team‘s business analyst also 
facilitated a subsequent contract (funded by the Orion Project) to acquire digitized copies of 
critical reports identified in the survey.  This contract was in place in July 2010.  The assessment 
team considered the data in these reports essential to creating a valid CPAS PRA and helping 
ensure an efficient development test program.  These digitized reports will be stored in 
perpetuity in an NESC-sponsored, Agency-wide repository of entry, descent, and landing (EDL) 
data. 
4.3 Design, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (DDT&E) Guiding 
Principles 
During the assessment the assessment team discussed design development best practices.  
The assessment team provided a reference copy of NASA-TM- 2008-215126, Design, 
Development, Testing and Evaluation (DDT&E) - Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human 
Rated Spacecraft Systems [Ref. 1] to the Project at its first interim outbrief in April 2009.  The 
report provides seven guiding principles that apply to those who conceive, produce, and operate 
integrated systems, individual components, or system elements.  The guiding principles are  
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supported by a foundation of established project management, systems engineering, S&MA, and 
operations practices: 
1. Define a clear and simple set of prioritized program needs, objectives and constraints, 
including safety, that form the validation basis for subsequent work. 
2. Manage and lead the program with a safety focus, simple and easy to understand 
management structures, and clear lines of authority and responsibility among the 
elements. 
3. Specify safety and reliability requirements through a triad of fault tolerance, bounding 
failure probability, and adhering to proven practices and standards. 
4. Manage complexity by keeping the primary (mission) objectives as simple and 
minimal as possible and adding complexity to the system only where necessary to 
achieve these objectives. 
5. Conceive the right system conceptual design early in the life cycle by thoroughly 
exploring risks from the top down and using a risk-based design loop to iterate the 
operations concept, the design, and the requirements until the system meets mission 
objectives at minimum complexity and is achievable within constraints. 
6. Build the system right by applying a multilayered, ―defense in depth‖ approach of 
following proven design and manufacturing practices, holding independent reviews, 
inspecting the end product, and employing a ―test like you fly, fly like you test‖ 
philosophy. 
7. Seek and collect warning signs and precursors to safety, mission success, and 
development risks throughout the life cycle and integrate those into a total risk picture 
with appropriate mitigation activities. 
The assessment team observed numerous examples of the Project implementing the guiding 
principles recommended in the DDT&E report.  
During the assessment the Project exhaustively examined top-level architecture options, explored 
risks from the top down, and employed a risk-based design loop to iterate the operations concept, 
the design, and the requirements until the system appeared to meet mission objectives at 
minimum complexity and within achievable constraints.  The assessment team observed 
numerous positive examples of curiosity, skepticism, and imaginative inquiry during several 
CPAS Project meetings.  These practices were consistent with elements of DDT&E guiding 
principle 2. 
The assessment team also observed commendable Project application of DDT&E guiding 
principal 3.  The DDT&E report notes that Projects should consider off-nominal and failure 
scenarios to generate requirements that seek to prevent faults and ensure crew safety in spite of 
faults.  The report advises that to maximize safety and reliability, systems should be designed 
with a fault-tolerant architecture that is supported by probabilistic safety, reliability, and risk 
analyses supported by data, evidence, and/or analysis data.  The assessment team observed this  
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in Project practice, although it noted occasions of application of un-validated analysis results in 
the process. 
The DDT&E report also notes (in supportive narrative for guiding principal 3) that the objective 
of bounding a system‘s probability of failure during development is to encourage a thorough 
investigation into risks including uncertainty and common cause such that system design 
decisions and underlying risk analysis can be defended.  The report further notes that the process 
of estimating failure probabilities should challenge design teams to achieve deeper understanding 
of its system and its environment and facilitate design trades while protecting against worst-case 
assumptions that can cause a design to become overly complex.  The DDT&E report advises  
―The value of a probability estimate is not so much contained in the absolute 
number but in the thorough investigation, debate, and discussions by designers 
and operators about controlling the potential for failures based on their likelihood, 
history of similar systems, and uncertainties inherent in the system design. The 
analysis of the system design must consider the integrated whole and include a 
top-down assessment. The analyses are most useful for evaluating and comparing 
design and operations alternatives and validating the chosen system design. To 
ensure valid comparison correct statistical methods should be used to determine 
probability of failure and include all available data sources.‖   
The assessment team observed exemplary application of this practice by the Project, although it 
noted instances of improper use of statistical methods in the process.  
Guiding principal 4 in the DDT&E report encourages Projects to keep primary mission 
objectives as simple and minimal as possible and to add complexity to a system only where 
necessary to achieve those objectives.  The assessment team observed with satisfaction that the 
Gen-2 architecture is less complex than several that were considered. 
However, the assessment team observed that the complexity of the CPAS management structures 
and its lines of authority and responsibility were sub-optimal and that the observed complexity 
was contrary to elements of DDT&E guiding principal 2. 
CPAS was government-furnished equipment (GFE) with Jacobs ESCG contracted to manage AS 
as the Project‘s design developer.  LM was responsible for parachute mortars, riser cutters, and 
other elements the assessment team thought were critical to CPAS reliability.  This is described 
in more detail in Section 6.6 and the team‘s assessment can be found in Section 7.2.4. 
The assessment team felt strongly that fragmenting DDT&E responsibilities among multiple 
entities posed significant risks to CPAS reliability.  The assessment team thought Orion should 
have empowered a single entity with the responsibility for the design, development, integration, 
and certification (DDI&C) of the entire Landing Recovery System (LRS).  It was recognized that 
this multi-element organization was unlikely to change for Orion.  The risks associated with  
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organizational complexity were generally recognized by the Project and systems engineering 
practices were being employed in an effort to manage those risks. 
The assessment team created an Agency lesson learned for future Programs that includes 
development of parachute architectures for recovery of human-rated space vehicles.  The lesson 
would apply whether the system was developed by NASA or by a commercial company with 
NASA oversight: Developers of parachute architectures for recovery of human-rated space 
vehicles should empower a single entity with the responsibility for the DDI&C of the entire LRS.  
The responsibility should include primary and secondary structures, control systems, crew 
protection systems, parachutes, mortars, and any impact-attenuation systems.  
The assessment team concludes that the CPAS Project can deliver a robust and reliable CPAS 
with the Gen-2 architecture and develop it in a cost-effective manner, if the Project rigorously 
adheres to DDT&E best practices and guiding principles and if the NESC recommendations in 
Section 8.3 of this report are considered. 
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5.0 Assessment Plan 
In November 2008, the Director of Engineering for JSC requested the NESC form a cross-
Agency and multidiscipline team to independently assess the CPAS design, the CPAS Project‘s 
PRAs, and the methods used to derive them.  The assessment team was also asked to assess the 
Project‘s development test plans and design development practices that might affect the system 
reliability.  The requestor asked for recommendations that could ―strike the proper balance 
between reliability enhancing (development) tests and… project cost and schedule.‖  Cost and 
schedule analyses were out of scope for this assessment, but the assessment team did analyze 
means to improve the efficiency of the Project‘s test plans.  See Appendix A for the stakeholder 
request.  
The assessment‘s objectives were to identify reliability-enhancing opportunities for the:  
 Parachute system design 
 Reliability estimation methodologies 
 Development program (development tests and analysis, and verification plans) 
 Design development and integration practices   
The assessment team consisted of seven contract consultants, eight NASA civil servants from 
five NASA Centers, and two team members from other United States (U.S.) Government 
entities.  The core team had two subteams: one for parachute design development and one for 
reliability.  Some team members had expertise in disciplines or systems pertinent to the 
assessment including materials, modeling and simulation, structures, avionics, and electrical.  
Other team members contributed expertise in systems integration, systems safety, test 
engineering, and experimental design.  All assessment team members worked part time, 
generally less than 10 hours per week. 
The overall assessment time was 15 noncontiguous months between December 2008 and  
April 2010.  The team‘s assessment activities were divided into three RPs: 
 RP-1 December 2008–March 2009 
 RP-2 April 2009–May 2009 and July–August 2009 
 RP-3 September 2009–April 2010 
RP-2 included a planned assessment hiatus from May–July 2009.  This stand-down was due to 
slippages in the Project schedule.  The hiatus allowed the Project to make progress toward a 
more concrete design architecture, corresponding reliability work products, and a draft 
development test plan.  The stand-down also allowed the preservation of assessment budget. 
During this assessment, the team monitored Project meetings and reviewed Project presentation 
charts, draft documents, test reports, and other technical material.  The assessment team attended 
three Project IDRs [Refs. 2, 3, and 4], one at the beginning of each RP.  The assessment team 
conducted weekly discussions to identify findings consistent with the plan objectives. 
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Parachute development subteam members and reliability subteam members actively taught each 
other aspects of their respective crafts.  Assessment team members with experience on the 
Apollo Program, SSP SRB, and military parachute systems shared program-specific experiences 
that were pertinent to CPAS discussions.  Short tutorials were provided by some team members 
for the benefit of others: 
 Introduction to parachutes (Cruz) 
 Parachute definitions, nomenclature, and types (Behr) 
 Reefing line cutters (Herr) 
 Design of Experiments (Parker) 
Assessment team members not on the parachute subteam also referred to the Parachute Recovery 
Systems Design Manual, T. W. Knacke (1992) [Ref. 5] to understand parachute development 
terms and conventions.  Multiple copies of this ‗parachute bible‘ were made available by team 
member Michael Herr (whose organization, the U. S. Navy, owns the rights to publish this 
document). 
The assessment team outbriefed findings, observations, and interim NESC recommendations to 
the Project at the end of each RP and provided written stakeholder summaries of these to the 
requester.  In all, 55 interim NESC recommendations were provided.  Most of these 
recommendations were acted upon in part or in whole by the Project over the course of the 
assessment, or they were overcome by ongoing Project design decisions.  Clarifying material for 
two interim NESC recommendations related to experimental design techniques was also 
provided to the Project.  This material included questions that the assessment team had heard 
asked by Project members during Project meetings, with answers from the assessment team.  The 
three stakeholder summaries and associated material are located in Appendices B, C, and D.  
This final report provides findings, observations, and final NESC recommendations that pertain 
to the Gen-2 CPAS architecture, which was current at the conclusion of the assessment period in 
April 2010. 
6.0 Problem Description, Scope of Review, and Architectural 
Evolution 
6.1  Problem Description 
The original CPAS architecture was derived and scaled up from the Apollo Program ELS.  The 
design included two mortar-deployed drogue parachutes, three mortar-deployed pilot parachutes, 
and three pilot-parachute-deployed main parachutes.  NASA and AS, its subcontracted design 
development company, conducted path-finding development drop testing of this CPAS system, 
known as Gen-1, prior to calendar year 2008 (CY08) (see Figure 6.1-1).   
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Figure 6.1-1. CPAS Gen-1 Con Ops 
 
In early 2008, Project managers changed the CPAS architecture to what was then reasoned to be 
a simpler and more reliable design.  This architecture included two mortar-deployed drogue 
parachutes and three main parachutes.  The main parachutes were physically deployed by the 
separation of Orion‘s FBC from the vehicle.  
In September 2008, the Orion Engineering Review Board (ERB) identified the CPAS design as 
the top risk contributor for loss of crew (LOC) for the Orion vehicle, based on a CPAS Project 
estimate that the probability of catastrophic damage to more than one main parachute during 
deployment was 1:217.  This ERB finding precipitated the request for this NESC independent 
assessment. 
6.2  Scope of Review 
The technical assessment‘s planned objectives are described in Section 5.0.  Taking a systems 
engineering approach, the scope of the NESC assessment team‘s hardware purview extended 
beyond CPAS components, to include components of other systems that were considered critical 
to the reliable function of CPAS.  These included mortars, riser cutters, and avionics.  Certain 
Orion structural elements and features were also in-scope, including its FBC, forward bay 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
08-00487 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
CEV Parachute Assembly System Independent  
Design Reliability Assessment 
Page #: 
20 of 109 
 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-08-00487 
gussets, docking tunnel, and riser attach hardware.  NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) reliability 
was also reviewed.  Most remaining Orion systems and structures were beyond the scope of the 
assessment team‘s review.  
Figure 6.2-1 shows an early Project assessment of the general boundary between CPAS and the 
Orion CEV, as identified by the Project at the beginning of RP-1.  The figure is illustrative of 
issues to be identified later in this report but is not all inclusive.  It does not for example include 
deployment bags, retention systems, or other CPAS components.  
 
 
Figure 6.2-1. CPAS/CEV Boundaries 
 
The scope of the assessment team‘s review also included Project reliability work products, 
principally but not limited to, FTAs and PRAs.  The Project‘s development test plans and 
planned verification activities were also in-scope.  The assessment team also considered aspects 
of organizational structure, and Project design development and integration practices to be within 
the scope of its assessment, inasmuch as they may affect reliability. 
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Section 6.0 details the chronological evolution of the CPAS architecture, the Project‘s PRA and 
other reliability products, and the Project‘s requirements, testing, analyses, and verification 
plans.  The section is organized by the three RPs that encompassed the entire period of 
assessment.  These are aligned with three interim stakeholder summaries which can be found in 
Appendices B, C, and D.  A subsection is also included that describes the Project‘s 
organizational structure.   
Section 7.0 contains the assessment team‘s analysis of the information in Section 6.0 as it 
pertains to the final findings, observations, and NESC recommendations listed in Section 8.0. 
6.3 Architectural Evolution 
The CPAS design evolved substantially during the overall assessment period, but the assessment 
team‘s objectives and scope remained unchanged.  
The assessment team spent time early in the assessment reviewing the architectures of heritage 
Apollo Program ELS, SSP SRB, and CxP Ares I recovery systems.  The assessment team also 
discussed aspects of some planetary spacecraft parachute systems.  Parachute design 
development subteam members gave tutorials on mortar and reefing cutter designs and function 
for the benefit of other team members less knowledgeable of parachute systems.  The assessment 
team also discussed parachute canopy materials applications and material joint testing.  
During early team meetings, the assessment team discussed CPAS interfaces with the CM.  The 
assessment team also discussed information in the Apollo Experience Report, Earth Landing 
System (ELS), NASA TN D-7437 (1973) [Ref. 6], written by the heritage Apollo parachute test 
manager on the assessment team.  The assessment team discussed at length the differences 
between the CPAS and ELS drogue deployment envelopes, system layouts, and components.  
The assessment team also reviewed the Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) design and its 
separation Con Ops as it impacted CPAS reliability following an abort. 
The CPAS architecture evolution during the three assessment RPs are described chronologically 
in this subsection.  
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6.3.1  Review Period 1—December 2008 through March 2009 
RP-1 spanned December 2008 through March 2009.  The Project conducted IDR-1 in December 
2008.  At that time, the CPAS PDR was scheduled for June 2009.  The CPAS architecture and 
nominal concept of operations were as follows:   
During descent through the atmosphere after reentry, or following a pad abort or an ascent abort, 
the initiating event in the CPAS Con Ops was the simultaneously electrical triggering of two 
drogue mortars.  The mortars were located in adjacent sectors among the six sectors of the CM 
forward bay and were aimed outward approximately 45 degrees apart from each other and 
approximately normal to the CM conic outer mold line (OML).  The mortars were physically 
mounted to holes in the CM FBC and fired their drogue parachutes through those holes (see 
Figure 6.3-1). 
 
 
Figure 6.3-1. Drogue Mortars 
 
Each mortar ejected a single drogue parachute and a length of textile riser into the free stream 
flow through which the CM was descending, at nominally 120 f/s.  The riser length was the first 
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item out of a mortar, followed by the packed drogue parachute and then the mortar sabot.  Both 
risers were attached to a single drogue confluence fitting.  Attached to the drogue confluence 
fitting, in addition to the two drogue risers, were three textile harness legs.  The opposite end of 
each drogue harness leg was attached to a fitting on the CM FBC.  The three attach fittings were 
120 degrees apart.  Drogue riser loads were reacted to the CM through the FBC.  The three 
harness legs and the drogue confluence fitting were stowed in recessed circumferential cavities 
on top of the FBC, along with remaining lengths of drogue riser, covered with thermal protection 
system (TPS) material (see Figure 6.3-2).  
 
 
Figure 6.3-2. Drogue Harness Legs and Confluence Fitting Stowed 
 
In the Con Ops for this architecture, each mortar-ejected drogue parachute would begin to open 
as it reached ‗line stretch,‘ when its riser and suspension lines are fully deployed (see  
Figure  6.3-3).  After this point, the drogue parachutes would dis-reef twice to their full-open 
position, using redundant reefing line cutters.  The drogue parachute canopies were conical 
canopy ribbon parachutes with a nominal diameter of 23 ft.  They had a continuous 2.0-in.-wide 
ribbon with one splice per ribbon and no more than two splices on any one gore.    
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Figure 6.3-3. Drogue Parachutes 
 
At a preprogrammed, sensed altitude, the FBC would be mechanically released from the CM and 
the CM would fall away from the drogue-suspended FBC.  In this way the drogue parachutes 
provided the forces required to separate the FBC from the CM.  
Each of the three main parachutes was packed in its own protective deployment bag (d-bag).  
The three main d-bags were restrained with textile straps to the CM upper deck, one in each of 
three of the six sectors of the CM forward bay.  The stowed arrangement of the three d-bags was 
asymmetric.  The upper surface of the main d-bags was loosely attached by textile straps to the 
underside of the FBC, at points beneath the drogue attach points.  Energy-modulating textile 
devices were incorporated into these straps to dissipate snatch loads that would result when the 
CM rapidly fell away from the decelerated FBC.  
In this architecture, the main parachute suspension lines and portions of their risers were also 
stowed inside the main d-bags.  The bottom ends of the three main risers were attached to a 
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single main parachute confluence fitting (see Figure 6.3-4) that was stowed in a stowage 
container in one sector of the CM forward bay. 
 
 
Figure 6.3-4. Main Parachute Confluence Fitting 
 
Three textile harness legs were also attached to the main confluence fitting.  One harness leg was 
shorter than the other two, to provide a desired hang angle for limiting CM loads during water 
landings.  Most of the lengths of the harness legs were to be stowed in the same stowage 
container as the confluence fitting (see Figure 6.3-5).  The bottom end of each main harness leg 
was attached to a fitting on the CM.  The three CM attach fittings were 120 degrees apart, 
located atop three of the six forward bay gussets.  These locations were clocked 60 degrees from 
the locations of the three FBC fittings.  
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
08-00487 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
CEV Parachute Assembly System Independent  
Design Reliability Assessment 
Page #: 
26 of 109 
 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-08-00487 
 
Figure 6.3-5. Main Parachute Packs Stowed 
 
As the CM was released from the monolithic FBC, two redundant donut ties attached at the ends 
of six Kevlar
®
 retention straps were to be cut by redundant, electrically commanded cutters (see 
Figure 6.3-6).    
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Figure 6.3-6. Main Parachute Pack Retention System at IDR-1 
 
The separation action of the CM free-falling away from the drogue-suspended FBC would then 
physically lift the three main d-bags from their stowed locations by two textile handles.  These 
handles had textile energy modulators incorporated to reduce the loads associated with what 
would otherwise be large pack acceleration at the moment of extraction.  
As the FBC/CM separation increased, the main risers, suspension lines, and parachute canopies 
were sequentially pulled from inside their respective d-bags.  Simultaneous to this, the main 
confluence fitting was lifted from its stowage container to its deployed position (see  
Figure 6.3-7). 
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Figure 6.3-7. Main Parachutes Deploying 
 
Ultimately the three empty main d-bags were lifted away with the FBC, and the three fully 
deployed main parachutes would begin to inflate.  
At this point, the main parachutes would dis-reef twice to their full-open position, using 
redundant reefing line cutters.  The main parachute canopies were ringsail parachutes with a 
nominal diameter of 116 ft (see Figure 6.3-8).  
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Figure 6.3-8. Main Parachutes 
 
One other key feature installed along the main parachute risers (not shown in previous figures) 
was the rotation torque limiter (i.e., keeper) (see Figure 6.3-9).  This triangular metallic device 
was included to limit roll torque resistance to below 450 ftlbf when the CM was suspended 
under its opened main parachutes.  This feature provided a means for the CM reaction control 
system (RCS) to have sufficient authority to roll the CM into a toe-forward position just prior to 
water landing.  This landing maneuver was a method to reduce water-landing design loads on the 
CM structure.  
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Figure 6.3-9. Rotation Torque Limiter Keeper for Main Harness Legs 
 
For this architecture, the keeper was to be stowed in a bag in the forward bay, secured alongside 
the gusset between the two drogue mortars.  The three main harness legs were rigged to pass 
through the keeper.  When the three main parachutes were deployed, the keeper was held by 
straps at a position about 6 ft beneath the confluence fitting.  This would provide a 6-ft section of 
gathered, parallel harness legs between the confluence fitting and the keeper.  This section of 
gathered harnesses was envisioned to ‗twist up‘ and ‗untwist‘ in operation, in response to 
commands from RCS rockets (see Figures 6.3-10 and 6.3-11). 
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Figure 6.3-10. Rotation Torque Limiter Keeper for Main Harness Legs, Deployed 
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Figure 6.3-11. Rotation Torque Limiter Keeper for Main Harness Legs, Deployed Detail 
 
During RP-1, the Project made a decision to add two lightweight auxiliary parachutes to the FBC 
design.  These parachutes were to be deployed after the CM was dropped from the drogue-
suspended FBC.  This would provide additional deceleration for the heavy monolithic FBC, to 
reduce the risk of the FBC catching up to the main-parachute-suspended CM and contacting and 
damaging components of the main parachutes.  Each auxiliary parachute would be stowed on the 
underside of the FBC, directly above the drogue mortars prior to FBC release.  They would be 
deployed by the inertial force from a metallic slug attached by a cable, accelerated by a ‗drogue 
gun‘ that could be mechanically or pyrotechnically activated. 
The auxiliary parachutes were approximately 32-ft ringsail parachutes (see Figure 6.3-12). 
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 Figure 6.3-12. Auxiliary Parachutes 
 
Near the end of RP-1, the Project made two more significant changes to the architecture. 
In certain deployment circumstances, ‗pre-stroking‘ of the textile energy modulators that were 
built into the d-bag handles was thought to pose a risk of burning or damaging of a main 
parachute during deployment.  The addition of textile bootstrap devices called ‗kicker straps‘ 
was considered as a possible solution but ultimately discarded by the Project.    
The Project opted instead to delete the FBC extraction of the main parachute d-bags and add 
three FBC-extracted pilot parachutes to the architecture.  The pilot parachute d-bags were to be 
secured with retention cords to the underside of the FBC, each one on the opposite side of a 
gusset from a main parachute pack (see Figure 6.3-13).  
When the FBC was released and the CM separated from the drogue-supported FBC, the pilot    
d-bag restraints would each be cut by a knife on a textile lazy leg strap.  The continued physical 
separation of the CM free falling away from the drogue-suspended FBC would then pull the pilot 
risers, suspension lines, and parachute canopies from within their respective d-bags.  The pilot 
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parachutes would open to full without dis-reefing.  The pilot parachutes were approximately    
10-ft-diameter conical ribbon cut-gore parachutes. 
 
 
Figure 6.3-13. Pilot Parachutes Stowed 
 
Once opened, each pilot parachute riser would then propagate the unlacing of the retention 
system on one main d-bag and lift it from its stowed location (see Figure 6.3-14). 
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Figure 6.3-14. Pilot Parachutes Deployed 
 
The Project also replaced the single drogue confluence fitting with two individual drogue 
confluence rings.  The metallic rings would be stowed, one each, inside the drogue mortars on 
top of the drogue parachutes and risers.  With this change, three textile harness legs were 
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replaced with six thinner textile harness legs, stowed as before on top of the FBC and covered 
with TPS (see Figure 6.3-15).  
 
 
Figure 6.3-15. Drogue Harness Legs Stowed and Deployed, with Dual Confluence Rings 
 
The three drogue harness leg attach fittings were modified to accommodate two harness ends 
each, instead of one (see Figure 6.3-16). 
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Figure 6.3-16. Drogue Harness Leg Attachment Fittings Detail 
 
6.3.2  Review Period 2—April 2009 through August 2009 
RP-2 spanned April 2009 through August 2009.  Early in this period the CPAS PDR was 
rescheduled from June to September 2009.  
Early during RP-2, the Project changed the attachment scheme for the main parachutes.  The 
main parachute confluence fitting and the three main parachute harness legs were eliminated.  
The three main risers were lengthened accordingly and their ends were all three to be attached to 
the ―zero-‖ gusset (i.e., the CM forward bay gusset that was between the two drogue mortars).  
The riser fairlead (i.e., the riser guide integrated into the gusset) was first envisioned as a 
triangular hole of similar geometry as the keeper in the top sloped surface of the gusset (see 
Figures 6.3-17 and 6.3-18). 
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Figure 6.3-17. Zero-gusset for Main Risers Single Attach Point, First Iteration 
 
Later in RP-2, the fairlead was revised to be three aligned, circular guide holes in the top sloped 
surface of the gusset.  
 
 
Figure 6.3-18. Zero-gusset for Main Risers Single Attach Point, Second Iteration 
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For this architecture, the metallic keeper was retained and was still to be stowed in a stowage bag 
in the forward bay, alongside the gusset between the two drogue mortars (see Figure 6.3-19).  
 
 
Figure 6.3-19. Rotation Torque Limiter Keeper for Main Risers, Stowed 
 
In this application, the three main risers would be rigged to pass through the keeper, rather than 
the harness legs (as described in Section 6.3.1).  The keeper would be held at the appropriate 
deployed position along the gathered risers by beckets sewn into the risers (see Figure 6.3-20).  
In this architecture, the length of the three gathered risers between the zero-gusset and the keeper 
was envisioned to ‗twist up‘ and ‗untwist‘ in operation, in response to commands from RCS 
rockets.  This would allow the roll maneuverability to orient the CM just prior to water landing.  
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Figure 6.3-20. Rotation Torque Limiter Keeper for Main Risers, Deployed Detail 
 
The Project conducted IDR-2 in May 2009, at which several additional architectural 
modifications were identified, including revision of the main parachute d-bag shape and the main 
d-bag retention and release system.  Each main d-bag would be held in place by an upper and a 
lower textile retention panel.  Each panel interfaced with the d-bag along one outer edge, using a 
daisy-chain lacing feature that had heritage design in the Apollo Program ELS main parachute 
daisy-chain retention system (see Figures 6.3-21 and 6.3-22).   
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Figure 6.3-21. Main Pack Retention System at IDR-2   
 
 
Figure 6.3-22. Main Parachute Pack Retention System, Detail   
 
At IDR-2 it was learned that the Orion Project changed the configuration of the CM Uprighting 
System (CMUS) tanks, replacing a single tank with five helium-filled composite overwrapped 
pressure vessels (COPVs).  The CMUS system would be utilized in the event the CM became 
inverted following a water landing.  It was noteworthy here because the system‘s five uprighting 
bags, five COPVs, and associated plumbing occupied the CM forward bay and so were 
integrated with CPAS components.  The five CMUS inflatable uprighting bags were stowed 
behind the three main parachutes, against the CM tunnel wall (see Figure 6.3-23).      
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Figure 6.3-23. CM Forward Bay Arrangement at IDR-2, Detail  
 
In June 2009, the Orion Project chartered an Integrated Design Assessment Team (IDAT) that 
included CPAS personnel, contractor and NASA personnel with responsibility for systems with 
which CPAS interfaced, NASA and contractor discipline experts, and NASA personnel from the 
Mars Science Laboratory EDL design development team.  The IDAT was chartered to assess 
sufficiently mature integrated design options for CPAS and to make design recommendations to 
the ERB for adoption by the Orion Project (see Figure 6.3-24). 
The IDAT was tasked to assess six key CPAS design issues: 
1. Insufficient parachute packaging volume and high packing densities 
2. Risk of parachute damage from near field re-contact during FBC separation 
3. Large mass threats due to high drogue inflation and kick loads 
4. Risk of failure of drogue deployment due to drogue harness extraction through TPS 
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5. Risk of parachute damage from far field re-contact of FBC due to immature concept for 
auxiliary parachute deployment 
6. CPAS as a top risk contributor to LOC for the Orion Project 
The IDAT explored four integrated areas of design trade space for a more reliable CPAS: 
1. FBC design options and methods of its jettison  
2. LAS design options and methods of its jettison  
3. CPAS parachutes methods of extraction and deployment 
4. FBC design options that may increase available volume for CPAS components 
 
 
Figure 6.3-24. Overview of IDAT Charter    
 
6.3.3  Review Period 3—September 2009 through April 2010 
RP-3 spanned September 2009 through April 2010.  Near the end of RP-2, the CPAS PDR had 
been rescheduled from September 2009 to March 2010. 
The Project conducted IDR-3 in September 2009.  At this review, the IDAT activity was ongoing 
so the review focused largely on Project Technical Requirements Specification (PTRS) Rev. A, 
April 2009, JSC-63497 [Ref. 7]; the Companion Document Rev. B, May 2009, JSC-64355  
[Ref. 8]; and the Master Verification Plan (MVP) approach framework.  
In November 2009 the Orion Project and CPAS adopted a number of architectural 
recommendations from the IDAT for CPAS, CM, and some of its other subsystems.  They are 
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described in the following sections, along with additional design refinements incorporated before 
April 2010. 
The CPAS Con Ops was changed such that FBC jettison would become the initiating event for 
atmospheric reentry, or following a pad or launch abort.  In addition, the FBC design was 
changed from a single large structure to a segmented design comprised of six individual L-
shaped panels, sealed where they meet over each gusset.  Each panel was to be held in place by 
two retention-and-release (R&R) mechanisms, one to fasten its top surface to the CM tunnel and 
one to fasten its bottom edge to the CM bulkhead (see Figures 6.3-25 and 6.3-26).  
All six panels would be released from the CM at subsonic speed, by redundant activation (by 
electrical or ordinance) of one length of mild detonating cord (MDC) that travels 360 degrees 
around the CM along the panels‘ lower circumferential edges, and one length of MDC that 
travels 360 degrees around the CM tunnel along the panels‘ upper circumferential edges.  
Each panel would be jettisoned by rapid inflation via redundant gas generators, of a single 
circular-section airbag installed beneath its larger panel surface.  
 
 
Figure 6.3-25. Segmented FBC and Representative Flow Analysis Image 
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Figure 6.3-26. Segmented FBC Detail 
 
In three forward bay sectors, the airbag force would react against a main parachute pack.  In two 
others, it would react against a drogue mortar cover.  In the sixth sector, the airbag would react 
against a newly added reactive structure installed over the CMUS COPVs (see Figure 6.3-27).   
The auxiliary parachute system that had been previously included to lower the ballistic 
coefficient of the monolithic FBC after its release was deleted.  Each FBC panel would retain its 
inflated airbag when jettisoned to provide it with a lower ballistic coefficient during descent. 
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Figure 6.3-27. CM Forward Bay Detail Showing FBC Panel Circular Push-off Areas 
 
The FBC-attached harnessed-drogue parachute architecture was replaced with an architecture 
where both drogue risers were attached inside the CM‘s zero-gusset, along with the three main 
risers.  The fairlead with five riser guide holes was referred to as the ‗flowerpot.‘  The two 
drogue parachutes and risers were stowed and deployed from within mortars, as with the 
previous architecture, but the two metallic drogue confluence rings were deleted.  The drogue 
risers were changed from textile to steel cables.  Lengths of steel riser were to be coiled and 
stowed inside the mortars.  Significantly, the drogue risers were routed under the FBC and did 
not interact with the FBC panels.  (See Figure 6.3-28.) 
Structural elements were added to span the zero-gussets and the two gussets on either side, so 
that all three gussets would participate in reacting riser loads across the predicted range of riser 
angles.  Drogue riser cutters were contained within the thick zero-gusset. 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
08-00487 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
CEV Parachute Assembly System Independent  
Design Reliability Assessment 
Page #: 
47 of 109 
 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-08-00487 
 
Figure 6.3-28. CM Zero-gusset Riser Flowerpot Fitting  
 
The five gussets other than the zero-gusset were redesigned to package the five CMUS 
uprighting bags, thereby removing the bags from being stowed behind the stowed main 
parachutes.  The gussets‘ redesign also accommodated stowage of parachute risers across their 
top surfaces, and routing of CMUS plumbing beneath them.  They also incorporated features 
along their edges for integrating with the main parachute d-bag retention system.  (See  
Figure 6.3-29.) 
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Figure 6.3-29. CM Common Gusset 
 
The CPAS Con Ops was changed such that very shortly following FBC panels jettison, the 
drogue parachutes were deployed only for atmospheric reentry.  For pad or ascent aborts up to a 
to-be-determined altitude, the drogues would not be used.  Rather, pilot parachute deployment 
would follow quickly after FBC panels‘ jettison, to shorten the time between FBC jettison and 
landing.  In either case, panel jettison was a required precursor to mortar firing.  No means was 
described to liberate a FBC panel stuck over a mortar.  
To provide more volume in the CM forward bay and to maintain main parachute packed 
densities below the required 38 psf, the Orion Project increased the vehicle backshell angle by 
2.5 degrees.  This was accomplished principally with changes to the backshell TPS; the pressure 
vessel structure below the forward bay was minimally affected (see Figure 6.3-30).  
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Figure 6.3-30. CM Backshell Angle Increase 
 
In addition, the integrally machined ribs on the CM bulkhead that serves as the floor of the 
forward bay were reduced in height in the three sectors where main parachute d-bags are stowed.  
Changes were also made to the LAS well design.  With balanced consideration given to various 
risks of LAS contact with the FBC during LAS jettison, the LAS wells were moved 2.3 in. 
radially outward and the LAS well escape angle was changed to 10 degrees with a 1-in. dynamic 
clearance.  Some LAS/CM electrical connectors were also relocated from the forward bay into 
the LAS.  
The main parachute deployment architecture was changed significantly during RP-3.  Mortar-
deployed pilot parachutes replaced the FBC-deployed pilot parachutes.  Three pilot mortars were 
located on opposite sides of gussets immediately adjacent to the three main parachutes.  This 
resulted in one pilot mortar in each of the two sectors that already held a drogue mortar and one 
pilot mortar in the sector that contained the CMUS COPVs.  Two variants of the pilot mortars 
can be seen in the detail in Figures 6.3-27 (racetrack-cross-section) and 6.3-28 (circular-cross-
section).  
The main parachute d-bag retention system was redesigned twice during RP-3.  Early in this 
review period, the Project redesigned the main d-bag retention system to include a daisy-chain 
arrangement of locking loops holding four textile retention flaps closed over the main d-bags.  
This retention scheme can be seen in Figure 6.3-31.  Note in the detail that this arrangement 
preceded the change from FBC-deployed pilot parachutes to mortar-deployed pilot parachutes.   
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Figure 6.3-31. Main Pack Retention System 
 
Unzipping of the d-bag retention loops was to have been initiated by breaking a break tie on each 
pack, by the action of a cut-knife pulled by a lanyard attached to the pilot riser (see  
Figures 6.3-32 and 6.3-33).  The continued action of the main riser would subsequently lift the d-
bag from its stowed location beneath the four flaps. 
 
 
Figure 6.3-32. Main Pack Retention System, Detail 1 
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Figure 6.3-33. Main Pack Retention System, Detail 2 
A system of corsets and beckets would be cinched during rigging to help the d-bag retain its 
shape and prevent its contact with the FBC inner mold line (IML) (see Figure 6.3-34). 
 
 
Figure 6.3-34. Main Pack Retention System, Detail 3 
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Later during RP-3, in part to utilize the additional volume provided by the increased CM 
backshell angle, the main d-bag‘s outer surface shape was simplified to a large-radiused surface 
with no facets.  Its upper outer and lower outer edges were designed to be a constant radius from 
gusset to gusset.  Its shape was to be controlled by a system of corsets and beckets sewn into the 
d-bag (see Figures 6.3-35).  As with the previous d-bag design, these would prevent contact with 
the FBC IML. 
 
 
Figure 6.3-35. Main Pack Retention System, Detail 4 
 
Each main d-bag was to be retained to the two gussets between which it was stowed using mated 
textile panels on the gusset outer and upper edges, and the d-bags.  The panels were looped 
together using a daisy-chain retention system.  A crow‘s foot along the outer lower edge of the  
d-bag pinned to an attach strap on the floor of the forward bay provided additional restraint (see 
Figure 6.3-36).  
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Figure 6.3-36. Main Pack Retention System, Detail 5 
 
One curve pin terminated each of the two daisy chains and a third pin secured the crow‘s foot.  
Lanyards were attached to each textile pilot parachute riser to pull these curve pins out and 
initiate the unlacing of the daisy chain loops.  (See Figures 6.3-37 and 6.3-38.)  
 
Figure 6.3-37. Main Pack Retention System, Detail 6 
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Figure 6.3-38. Main Pack Retention System, Detail 7 
 
The pilot risers would split along this span, and the two textile bridles would each unzip one side 
of retention loops (see Figure 6.3-39).  The assessment team‘s understanding was that the riser 
halves would be integrated loop-by-loop along the length of the daisy chain, to assist its opening.  
The two textiles would rejoin as one textile riser on the pack top.  Continuing action by the pilot 
parachute force would lift the released main d-bag from its stowed position at a central lift point 
in the middle of the d-bag top surface. 
 
 
Figure 6.3-39. Main Pack Retention System, Detail 8 
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The main parachutes, suspension lines, and most of the risers were still to be packed into the 
main d-bags.  The main risers were changed from textile to braided steel cables.  Various design 
options for cutting the steel drogue and main risers inside the zero-gusset were being vetted at 
the end of RP-3.  
The metallic torque reducing keeper remained as a part of the architecture at the end of RP-3.  
The Project was conducting analysis and planning tests to determine whether the closeness of the 
riser guide holes in the flower pot was sufficient to limit the roll torque to the required 
maximum.  If it became necessary to retain the keeper in the design, then it and the lengths of 
steel main risers between the zero-gusset and the keeper would be stowed in the FBC. 
At the end of RP-3, the CM also included two ramps in the forward bays behind each main 
parachute.  The lower ramp provided enclosed space for routing electrical and CMUS plumbing 
around the base of the CM tunnel.  The upper ramp served to protect the main d-bag from effects 
of the detonation of the upper MDC that was to release the FBC panel.  (See Figure 6.3-40.)  
 
 
Figure 6.3-40. Main Pack Ramps 
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6.4  PRA and other Reliability Products 
The evolution and refinement of the Project‘s PRA and other reliability information are 
described in the following sections. 
6.4.1  Review Period 1—December 2008 through March 2009 
A preliminary FTA, Hazard Analysis (HA), and PRA were provided at IDR-1.  PRA failure 
estimates were generated from reliability data obtained from the following sources: 
1. Parachute drop data from the U.S. Army, Apollo Program, Soyuz Program, and SSP 
SRB. 
2. Vendor component data. 
3. Component reliability predictions computed from the intersections of material strength 
and applied load probability distributions (load-strength interference method). 
The Project showed data that SSP SRB parachute contact with its main parachute support system 
during extraction had occurred 3 times out of 651 demands (1:217).  The CPAS Project assessed 
that this data was pertinent to CPAS, equivalent to the CPAS failure mode ―deployment failure 
damage due to structural contact.‖  The Project noted that the SSP SRB architecture assured that 
only one out of three parachutes could fail by this mode, but that the CPAS architecture at that 
time did not preclude multiple parachute contacts with structure.  The Project computed system 
reliability if only one CPAS main parachute failed by this mechanism to be 1:8,205.   
The failure estimate of 1:217 became the driving value in the CPAS PRA.  The Project noted that 
simulation analyses and ground and flight testing would ultimately refine this failure probability 
for the CPAS architecture.  
AS provided reliability data at IDR-1 for the drogue and main parachute assemblies.  The 
reliability of most components had been predicted from the intersections of material strength and 
applied load distributions to determine the ―areas of unreliability‖ (from the area of intersection 
of the two distributions).  (See Tables 6.4-1 and 6.4-2.) 
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Table 6.4-1. Drogue Parachute Reliability Estimates at IDR-1 
   Description                                                                                 
Reliability 
Prediction  
Source  Failure Rate (1/x)  
Drogue Parachute  0.9966997  Sum  2,473  
   Parachute Packing  0.9999000  Test  10,000  
   Drogue Bag Separation  0.9997000  Test  3,333  
   Suspension Lines/Skirt Attach  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
   Vent Line Attach  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
   Suspension Lines/Riser Attach  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
   Drogue Riser  0.9999993  Prediction  1,428,571  
   Horizontal/Radial  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
   Skirt Band  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
   Reefing Line  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
   Cutter Operation, Drogue Flap  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
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Table 6.4-2. Main Parachute Reliability Estimates at IDR-1 
   Description                                                                                Reliability
Prediction  
Source  Failure Rate (1/x)  
Main Parachute  0.9956148  Sum  568  
   Parachute Packing  0.9970000  Test  10,000  
   Quarter Bag Attach  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
   Suspension Lines/Skirt Attach  0.9987597  Prediction  806  
   Vent Line Attach  0.9998816  Prediction  8,446  
   Suspension Lines/Riser Attach  0.9999998  Prediction  5,000,000  
   Main Riser  0.9999998  Prediction  5,000,000  
   Main Seam  0.9999998  Prediction  5,000,000  
   Skirt Band  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
   Reefing Cutter  0.9999700  Test  33,333  
   Reefing Line Strength  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
   Pin / Cutter Operation, Main Flap  0.9999999  Prediction  10,000,000  
 
The Project summarized that individual components, such as a skirt band, typically are reliable 
based on their stress-strength calculations.  The CPAS Project concluded that the intrinsic 
reliability of CPAS was limited by the main parachute reliability, which was limited by the 
reliability of the suspension lines and skirt attachment.  This failure mechanism was noted by the 
Project to be amenable to design modifications.  AS added that having one redundant drogue 
parachute and one redundant main parachute provided failure tolerance against catastrophic 
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failure, and that the drogue and main parachutes were being designed to survive loading 
conditions associated with a skipped reefing stage. 
In assessment team discussions during RP-1, reliability subteam members led productive 
discussions of reliability budget methods and benefits.  
In February 2009, the assessment team conducted a meeting with the Project.  The assessment 
team provided an advance list of 42 questions to improve its understanding of CPAS, its 
function, and associated reliability risks.  The assessment team asked questions on the 
verification and validation (V&V) of the simulation codes used for design and reliability 
decisions, which was declared to be outside the scope of CPAS‘s responsibilities.  The Project 
satisfactorily answered the assessment team‘s questions. 
The same month, the Project briefed the assessment team on two separate versions of CPAS fault 
trees (FTs) it was maintaining.  A comprehensive FT was being maintained by a NASA civil 
servant and simpler FT was being maintained by a Jacobs ESCG counterpart.  The latter FT was 
to be linked to the evolving PRA.  At this meeting the Project noted dashed lines in the FT that 
connected to faults key to CPAS reliability but considered administratively outside of CPAS.  
These were the responsibilities of developers of other CM subsystems.  At this meeting the 
Project also identified where additional data still was needed to refine the PRA. 
6.4.2  Review Period 2—April 2009 through August 2009 
At IDR-2 the Project presented a status summary of its Risk Assessment Executive Summary 
Report (RAESR), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)/critical items list, FTA, and HA.  
These deliverable products were to be completed by the S&MA team prior to the Project‘s PDR.  
The PRA was described as a living work product subject to change from testing and analyses 
results.  Two methods were described in use for determining PRA reliability values: predictions 
and estimates.  Predictions were described as being based on historical or vendor data.  Estimates 
were described as being based on expert opinion and engineering judgment (EJ).  The Project 
indicated intent to conduct an EE exercise.  
The Project identified 17 top-level failure modes as CPAS PRA ‗input values‘ for the FTA (see 
Table 6.4-3).  Thirteen of those were estimated in whole or in part by EJ.  Heritage Apollo 
Program data had been used to predict some values where available and applicable.     
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Table 6.4-3. CPAS Input Values for PRA at IDR-2 
PRA Input Value Source 
1. Drogue Confluence Failure EJ 
2. Vibration/Shock/Acceleration EJ 
3. Rigging Error EJ 
4. Far-Field Contact Computed value, EJ 
5. Near-Field Contact EJ 
6. Main Chute Entanglement EJ 
7. Drogue Chute Entanglement EJ 
8. Auxiliary/Auxiliary Chute Entanglement EJ 
9. Skipped Reefing State Failure EJ, predicted from Apollo Program data 
10. Main Chute Deployment Failure Predicted from Mercury/Gemini/Apollo and 
other Missions 
11. Auxiliary Chute Deployment Failure EJ 
12. Drogue Chute Deployment Failure Predicted from Mercury/Gemini/Apollo 
Missions  
13. Pilot Chute Deployment Failure EJ 
14. Lead Lag Failure EJ 
15. Inflation Failure EJ 
16. Reefing Cutter Fails to Dis-reef Failure Predicted from Apollo Program data 
17. Structural Failure Predicted from material properties 
 
At the IDR-2, reliability values for the 17 input values were presented for the cases of reentry, 
pad abort, and ascent abort (see Table 6.4-4). 
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 Table 6.4-4. CPAS PRA Input Value Failure Estimates at IDR-2 
 Nominal Case Pad Abort Case Ascent Abort Case 
1. Drogue Confluence Failure 1:1,000,000 1:1,000,000 1:1,000,000 
2. Vibration/Shock/ 
Acceleration 
1:1,000,000 1:5,000 1:5,000 
3. Rigging Error 1:100,000 1:100,000 1:100,000 
4. Far-Field Contact 1:10,000,000+ 1:10,000,000+ 1:10,000,000+ 
5. Near-Field Contact 1:1,000,000 1:2,035 1:2,035 
6. Main Chute Entanglement 1:1,000,000 1:250,000 1:250,000 
7. Drogue Chute 
Entanglement 
1:1,000,000 1:250,000 1:250,000 
8. Auxiliary/Auxiliary Chute 
Entanglement 
1:1,000,000 1:250,000 1:250,000 
9. Skipped Reefing State 
Failure 
1:1,427,000 1:1,427,000 1:427,000 
10. Main Chute Deployment 
Failure 
1:762 1:762 1:762 
11. Auxiliary Chute 
Deployment Failure 
1:1,000,000 1:1,000,000 1:1,000,000 
12. Drogue Chute 
Deployment Failure 
1:581 1:581 1:581 
13. Pilot Chute Deployment 
Failure 
1:1,000,000 1:1,000,000 1:1,000,000 
14. Lead Lag Failure 1:100,000 1:100,000 1:100,000 
15. Inflation Failure 1:1,000,000 1:1,000,000 1:1,000,000 
16. Reefing Cutter Fails to 
Dis-reef Failure 
1:1,523,030 1:1,523,030 1:1,523,030 
17. Structural Failure 1:1,000,000 1:1,000,000 1:1,000,000 
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The top-level estimated reliability for the cases of reentry, pad abort, or ascent abort was also 
presented at IDR-2 (see Table 6.4-5).  The estimates were less than the objective CPAS LOC 
target of 1:2,500.  
 
Table 6.4-5. CPAS PRA at IDR-2 
 
Mean 95% Confidence 
Nominal Reentry 1:9,502 1:2,397 
Pad Abort  1:6,045 1:2,016 
Ascent Abort  1:6,097 1:2,065 
 
During RP-2, the Project conducted an EE exercise to attempt to improve the failure and 
uncertainty estimates for their input values.  Two of the NESC parachute design and 
development subteam members participated as individual experts (not as representatives of the 
chartered assessment team).  Their participation involved writing answers to a Project-developed 
questionnaire.   
6.4.3  Review Period 3—September 2009 through April 2010  
During RP-3, the target for LOC for CPAS remained 1:2,500.  The target for the LRS was 1:850 
for the then-current Orion design variant 606G.  Recall that the LRS included CPAS plus drogue 
and pilot mortars, riser cutters, the fairlead fitting, NSIs, auxiliary parachute guns (if included in 
the design), and the CMUS.  
The Project provided copies of the FTA, HA, FMEA, and PRA to the assessment team at IDR-3.  
The HA and FMEA had been updated significantly.  The latter now listed the ‗Crit-1‘ main riser 
torque-reducing keeper as a candidate design for minimum risk (DFMR) component.    
The CPAS Reliability and Maintainability Report was shown to describe the Project‘s reliability 
determination methods as described previously at IDR-2: 
 Reliability Estimations: Expert opinion and EJ were used to determine reliability 
estimates.   
 Reliability Predictions: Based on historical or vendor data; examines previous reliability 
data collected on other Projects in order to predict component/system reliability for the 
activity under examination. 
The Project reported that based on reliability predictions from previous generation vehicles and 
expert opinion and the EJ of Project personnel and AS personnel, the top LOC estimate for 
nominal entry was 1:9,494.  This was consistent with the mean value reported at IDR-2.  
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The Project provided results from its recently completed EE exercise at IDR-3, but these data 
had not yet been incorporated into PRA input value estimates.  Five experts had participated.  
Based on their answers the top system-level CPAS failure probability was estimated to be 
1:1040.  Failure to deploy a main parachute (PRA input value #10) was estimated to be 1:613 for 
the nominal reentry case.  [Ref. 9: Expert Elicitation Summary Report for the Crew Exploration 
Vehicle (CEV) Parachute Assembly System (CPAS), JSC 64967, ESCG-6110-09-SS-DOC-0744.] 
A large variance was reported in the component reliability values.  The Project reported that the 
experts would be asked to reexamine the resulting estimates as a sanity check.  
When the CPAS architecture changes based on IDAT recommendations (described in Section 
6.3.3) were adopted in November 2009, the assessment team discussed these and assessed their 
impact on system reliability.  Near the end of RP-3, the Project indicated an intention to conduct 
a ‗delta‘ EE exercise with a revised list of PRA input values that reflected the latest architecture.  
6.5  Requirements, Testing, Analyses, and Verification Planning 
The evolution and refinement of the Project‘s requirements, testing, analyses, and verification 
planning are described in the following sections.  
6.5.1  Review Period 1—December 2008 through March 2009 
At IDR-1, the draft requirements document, the PTRS [Ref. 7, Baseline version] was provided to 
the assessment team for review.  A companion document, referred to as the Assumptions 
Document [Ref. 8, Rev. A] was also provided.  The key driving requirement for CPAS was to 
decelerate the CM to a safe vertical descent rate for landing.  The first reviewed draft of the 
PTRS allowed for one failed main parachute and one failed drogue parachute for cases of 
reentry, pad abort or ascent abort. 
During RP-1, three Gen-1 test reports were reviewed and discussed.  Information about the 
design development contractor‘s analysis tool, DCLDYN, was also reviewed and discussed.   
For reentry and abort cases, the assessment team created a first order event tree in spreadsheet 
form to facilitate team understanding and to identify critical events and risks. 
6.5.2  Review Period 2—April 2009 through August 2009 
The PTRS (Rev. A) was released in May 2009 and was discussed at IDR-2 [Ref. 7].  A key 
requirement change was made for the cases of pad or ascent aborts up to a to-be-determined 
altitude.  For aborts, CPAS would no longer be designed for ‗one failed main and one failed 
drogue,‘ but rather for ‗one failed main or one failed drogue.‘  For nominal reentry, the 
requirement remained ‗one failed main and one failed drogue.‘ 
The overall traceability for CPAS requirements was shown during RP-2 (see Figure 6.5-1).  The 
Project had begun to integrate its PTRS with LRS requirements. 
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Figure 6.5-1. Requirements Traceability 
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The first draft of the development test matrix was provided to the assessment team during RP-2.  
The draft V&V document was also provided.  After returning from its planned assessment hiatus, 
the assessment team focused much of its time during RP-2 discussing these items.  
6.5.3  Review Period 3—September 2009 through April 2010  
At IDR-3, the Project only cursorily reviewed the CPAS baseline design, recognizing that the 
ongoing IDAT activity would change the architecture later in the year. 
At the review, the Project described the methods by which the draft development test matrix had 
been created.  Test objectives had been derived principally from risks identified by the Project.  
These objectives then were considered in determining ground or flight testing needs.  Test 
configurations then had been created from parameters required to create test conditions  
(e.g., dynamic pressure, altitude, wing loading, wake, whether a representative parachute bay or 
FBC was required, etc).  Unique test configurations were identified, test objectives were 
grouped, and notional test vehicles assigned.  The result was fourteen unique flight tests and two 
sub-scale series tests.  These included main parachute performance evaluations of suspension 
line ratios, riser lengths, over-inflation control lines, and canopy porosity.  The sub-scale drops 
were to evaluate the uncertainties related to CPAS separation from the parachute test vehicle 
(PTV).  
The assessment team had assessed the test matrix independently and identified much of this 
detail prior to the IDR-3 (see Figure 6.5-2).  The assessment team presented its second interim 
outbrief to the Project the same week in September 2009 as the IDR-3. 
When the CPAS architecture changes based on IDAT recommendations were adopted in 
November 2009, the assessment team discussed these and created a revised ‗event spreadsheet‘ 
for this architecture to help the team identify areas of risk and concern that would necessitate test 
plan changes.  
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Figure 6.5-2. Representative Portion of Development Test Matrix 
 
6.5.4 Analysis 
Specific documents provided from attending these meetings are detailed in the following 
sections. 
The Project conducted three IDRs during the assessment team charter.  The presentations that 
were reviewed for technical content from the IDRs are System_IDR_12-08-08.ppt, 
System_IDR_II_5-20.ppt, System IDR II 9-21-09_Primary Charts.ppt.  Each presentation details 
performance results and assumptions used in designing CPAS parachutes and hardware.  The 
presentations describe the primary CPAS simulation tool, DCLDYN, and the models used to 
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characterize the performance of the parachute system.  An overview of multiple aspects of CPAS 
are presented, including the Con Ops, materials, interfaces, environment, proposed chute 
difficulties (torque limiter, confluence fitting, bag retention system, etc.), mass properties, safety, 
and reliability. 
During the IDR-3, a breakout session on simulation models and methods was conducted.  
Presentation material was detailed in CPAS_Sim_Methods_2009-09-21, 
Osiris_HiFiModel_Overview.ppt, and PA1_CPAS_GNC_TIM.ppt.  The session presentations 
describe analysis and reconstruction approaches of parachute test data by modeling and 
simulation.  The session also helped to identify how one of the primary simulations for Orion 
(Outdoor Scene and Infrared Image Simulation or OSIrIS) would incorporate its own parachute 
model with comparisons to models in Decelerator System Simulation (DSS). 
SE&I Integrated Product Team (IPT) teleconferences were attended by various assessment team 
members from January 2009 through March 2010.  The meetings were reviewed by the 
assessment team for CPAS design decisions and methodology.  Hardware IPT and CPAS MVP 
planning meetings were also attended during the same time frame. 
IDAT charts from the period of August 2009 to October 2009 were reviewed for design 
decisions and methodology.  Specific areas of NESC interest in relation to IDAT are the five 
chartered trade spaces: 
1. Parachute Architecture—2 Drogue/3 Main, 3 Drogue/3 Main, 2 Drogue/4 Main 
2. FBC Removal—Segmented versus Monolothic FBC 
3. Forward Bay Volume—Backshell angle modification, FBC modification, structural 
design changes 
4. LAS/CM Forward Attach—CM/LAS R&R design mitigation, LAS/CM attachment 
blisters/wells 
5. LAS Architecture—Orientation for post-abort LAS jettison, thrusters/jettison motor/tip 
chute jettison assist, straight-to-mains 
Drop test reports from the CPAS Development Test Gen-1 Series for the pilots, drogues, and 
mains (ESCG-4390-080-SP-DOC-0029, ESCG-4390-08-DOC-0028, and ESC-4390-08-SP-
DOC-0036) were reviewed for simulation model accuracy and prediction of parachute 
performance.   
The Apollo Program Experience Report (NASA-TN-D7437) and the Apollo 15 Parachute 
Failure Report (NASA-TM-X-67439) were reviewed for applicable lessons learned. 
Various PowerPoint
®
, Word
®
, and Excel
®
, documents provided from CPAS were reviewed that 
include the CPAS organizational charts, MVP, PTRS, assumptions document, interface 
documents, test plans, and reliability PRA. 
Various papers were reviewed detailing the Orion Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) 
architecture utilized by CEV to guide the entry vehicle to the parachute deploy conditions and 
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the associated triggers used to deploy the parachute.  AAS 07-071 ―NASA CEV Reference 
GN&C Architecture,‖ American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, ―Orion Entry, 
Descent, & Landing Simulation,‖ and ―GN&C Design and Data Book, Volumes I, IIa, and V.‖ 
6.5.5 Master Verification Plan 
An introduction to the Project‘s iterative verification strategy was provided at IDR-3 (see  
Figure 6.5-3).  
 
 
Figure 6.5-3. Verification Strategy at IDR-3 
 
The Project conducted an ‗MVP kickoff‘ meeting in October 2009 and provided the first draft of 
its MVP.  Four types of verification activities (VAs) were described in the MVP: verification by 
analyses, testing, inspection, and demonstration.  The VAs were frequently described 
figuratively as being identified at the ‗atomic‘ level.  (See Table 6.5-1.) 
 
  
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
08-00487 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
CEV Parachute Assembly System Independent  
Design Reliability Assessment 
Page #: 
69 of 109 
 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-08-00487 
Table 6.5-1. MVP Verification Strategy 
 Verification by Analysis  
High-fidelity dynamic/structural simulation process for Monte Carlo analysis to provide static and dynamic loads 
including protuberance interaction and friction and vehicle dynamics response to parachute and harnessing effects. 
Likely analogous to landing loads analysis process. 
Development team to develop, verify, validate, and accredit simulation. 
Analysis team to derive, analyze, and verify structural margins at all points. 
Requires Simulation tool for dynamics of adverse attitude riser contact. 
Requires Additional finite element model analyses (stress and loads/dynamics). 
 
Verification by Test   
Series of tests to validate/anchor simulation models (parachute effects, aero effects). 
 Spin tunnel testing (new, cheap—around $50K) 
 ¼-scale drop testing (new, in CPAS impact estimates for 3d/3m) 
 Full-scale pallet testing (new, in CPAS impact estimates for 3d/3m) 
 Pad Abort (PA)-1 flight test 
 CPAS PTV drop testing 
 Ascent Abort-2 flight test 
 PA-2 flight test 
Static ground testing using structural test authority for off-nominal loads applications including cases when wrapped 
around heatshield with opportunity to limit these as flight simulations are matured. 
 
Verification by Inspection   
Inspection (and perhaps some demonstration) for riser/structure interaction late in assembly sequence to verify the 
assessment team captured all possible interference. 
 
Verification by Demonstration   
Utilize current CPAS drop testing for system certification. 
Development PTV tests: 
 1 with drogue failure (To Be Decided (TBD) attitude/rate behavior) 
Qual PTV tests: 
 1 off-nominal attitude (e.g., apex forward) 
 1 with drogue failure (TBD attitude/rate behavior) 
 
At the MVP kickoff, the Project discussed plans to conduct follow-on activities to consolidate 
and aggregate VAs and to extend the tasks to accommodate hazard-control requirements, 
interface controls and other requirements, and qualification risks.  They stated an intent to 
comprehensively capture VAs during the engineering development phase. 
After the MVP kickoff and during subsequent Project meetings, the assessment team uncovered 
insufficient Project understanding of the test and verification recommendations the assessment 
team had provided in September 2009.  To remedy this, the assessment team conducted a 
question-and-answer meeting in December 2009.  This document is included in Appendix C. 
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6.6  Organizational Complexity  
The assessment team examined the organizational framework in which the Project was operating 
and discussed risks it could pose to the design and development of a reliable system.  (See 
Figures 6.6-1, 6.6-2, 6.6-3, and 6.6-4.)  
It is pertinent to describe the partition of responsibility for development of Orion hardware here.  
The CM included the gussets, tunnel, bulkhead, FBC, avionics, riser cutters, and LRS.  The LRS 
was comprised of two principal components: the Aerodynamic Decelerator System (ADS) and 
the CMUS.  The ADS was comprised principally of CPAS, plus other subcomponents including 
mortars, riser cutters, and auxiliary parachute guns (if any).  (See Figure 6.6-5.) 
AS was contracted through Jacobs ESCG to provide design and development data, test hardware, 
and test data for the Project.  AS did not have a production contract for CPAS at the time of this 
review. 
The Project was responsible for parachutes and their components, risers, deployment bags, 
confluence fittings (if any), torque reducer (if any), and other ancillary components. 
The Orion Project‘s lead contractor, LM, was responsible for several other components critical to 
CPAS reliability, including all mortars, all riser cutters, the fairlead fitting, and auxiliary 
parachute guns (if any).  LM was also responsible for integrating CPAS into the larger LRS, 
which included the CMUS.  LM also was responsible for integrating the LRS into the CM and 
for CM features critical for CPAS reliability, including the FBC and its jettison system, and the 
forward bay gussets and tunnel. 
The assessment team‘s understanding was that the design development data and test data were to 
be provided by AS (through its contract with Jacobs ESCG) to the Project.  The parachute 
system ultimately would be provided to LM as GFE.   
The CPAS SE&I (see Figure 6.6-1) and S&MA (see Figure 6.6-2) functions were shared by 
NASA and Jacobs ESCG, but top-level integration authority resided with the LM Engineering 
Review Board (see Figure 6.6-4).  
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Figure 6.6-1. CPAS Organization, SE&I 
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Figure 6.6-2. CPAS Organization, S&MA 
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Figure 6.6-3. CPAS Project Functional Team Organization Chart 
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Figure 6.6-4. GFE CPAS Boards and Panels Review Paths 
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Figure 6.6-5. CPAS/ADS/LRS/CM Interface Definitions at Conclusion of RP-3 
 
7.0 Data Analysis   
This section summarizes the assessment team‘s analyses of relevant Project information 
described in Section 6.0.  Section 7.1 provides an analytical context for the three sets of findings, 
observations, and interim NESC recommendations that are reproduced in Appendices B, C,  
and D.  Section 7.2 provides team analyses supporting the findings, observations, and final 
NESC recommendations provided in Section 8.0. 
7.1  Interim Analytical Assessment of Project Information 
The three NESC stakeholder summaries provided to the Project in April 2009, September 2009, 
and April 2010 provided time-sensitive interim recommendations intended to lower project 
technical and schedule risks.  The CPAS architecture changed considerably during this time, and 
the assessment team‘s interim deliverables reflected those changes as they occurred.  Many 
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related to developmentally transient architectural features that do not apply at the time of writing 
of this final report. 
7.1.1 Review Period 1—December 2008 through March 2009 
The evolution of the CPAS architecture during RP-1 is described in Section 6.3.1.  The other 
items reviewed during RP-1 are described in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.5.1.  At the time of IDR-1 in 
December 2008, the CPAS PDR was anticipated in June 2009. 
Beginning with the IDR-1, the assessment team reviewed a large amount of design data and 
project work products during RP-1, covering a broad range of issues: 
 Architecture   
 Design features   
 Design development methodology   
 System function   
 Reliability methodology   
 Requirements    
 Analysis and modeling    
 Organizational aspects that affect reliability     
The assessment team also discussed various architectural options under consideration by the 
Project.  The request for the assessment team had explicitly assumed there was an ―existing‖ 
design, but a concrete baseline did not exist and the Project‘s reliability work products were 
commensurately immature and their development test plans were still under development and not 
available for the assessment team to review.    
To compile and organize the many relevant issues discussed by the assessment team, a 
preliminary list of 336 factual statements (FSs) and 96 experience-based observations (EOs) was 
created.  
The assessment team derived from this list 20 findings, 24 observations, and 30 interim NESC 
recommendations.  These were approved by the NRB and outbriefed to Project stakeholders at 
AS in Santa Ana, CA, in April 2009.     
The first stakeholder outbrief and the supporting list of FSs and EOs can be found in  
Appendix B. 
The interim NESC recommendation R-3 from the first stakeholder outbrief is discussed further 
in Section 7.2.1.1, as part of narrative that supports the final NESC recommendation R-1 in this 
report.   
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7.1.2 Review Period 2—April 2009 through August 2009 
The evolution of the CPAS architecture during RP-2 is described in Section 6.3.2.  The other 
items reviewed during RP-2 are described in Sections 6.4.2 and 6.5.2.  During RP-2 the CPAS 
architecture continued to evolve.  At the time of IDR-2 in May 2009, the CPAS PDR was 
anticipated in November 2009. 
After discussing issues learned at the IDR-2, the assessment team took a 2-month hiatus, 
discontinued monitoring CPAS meetings and discontinued conducting weekly team meetings, 
until July 2009.  This stand-down was to allow the Project to make progress toward a more 
concrete design architecture definition, corresponding reliability work products, and a draft 
development test plan.  The assessment lead attended the Orion Subsystem Design Review in 
June 2009 and the System Module Review in July 2009, to remain abreast of CPAS design 
developments.  
The assessment team began meeting again in July 2009 when a draft development test matrix 
and a draft verification plan were made available by the Project for review.  While keeping 
abreast of design architecture options being vetted by the IDAT, the assessment team focused 
most of its discussions on the Project‘s development test plans, analyses plans, and verification 
activities.  The assessment team discussed test matrices derived from functional decomposition 
of systems and created a sample Functional Verification Matrix.  The assessment team also 
discussed applications of experimental design in planning CPAS development and verification 
activity.  
The assessment team created a second outbrief of three findings, two observations, and two 
interim NESC recommendations.  These were approved by the NRB and outbriefed to Project 
stakeholders at JSC in September 2009.   
One of the two recommendations provided specific guidance on the application of DOE 
techniques that can improve the effectiveness and resource-efficiency of the Project‘s 
development testing effort.  The other recommendation outlined a process for creating a 
comprehensive matrix of candidate verification tasks that the Project could use as a check against 
their nascent verification plan, to identify potential gaps and/or redundancies. 
The assessment team included supplemental material in the stakeholder outbrief, including an 
introductory explanation of potential benefits of using methods of statistical DOE, in particular 
comparison to using ‗one factor at a time‘ testing methods, and the sample Functional 
Verification Matrix.  During RP-3 the assessment team created a list of frequently asked 
questions (FAQs) pertaining to DOE (described in the following section).  
The second stakeholder outbrief, the sample of a Functional Verification Matrix, the DOE 
tutorial, and the list of FAQs can be found in Appendix C. 
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The interim NESC recommendation R-31 from the stakeholder interim outbrief 2 is discussed 
further in Section 7.2.3.2 as part of narrative that supports the final NESC recommendation R-6 
in this report. 
7.1.3 Review Period 3—September 2009 through April 2010.   
The evolution of the CPAS architecture during RP-3 is described in Section 6.3.3.  The other 
items reviewed during RP-3 are described in Sections 6.4.3 and 6.5.3.  At the time of IDR-3 in 
September 2009, the CPAS PDR was anticipated in March 2010.  By the end of RP-3, the PDR 
was scheduled for August 2010. 
At the beginning of RP-3, the assessment team composition was adjusted.  The assessment 
team‘s structures discipline expert and one parachute design development expert left the team.  A 
second DOE expert and a heritage systems safety expert were added to the team. 
The assessment team continued to discuss various design options being vetted by the IDAT.  
The assessment team also continued to discuss the Project‘s draft verification plan.  The 
assessment team detected that Project personnel may not have fully understood the interim 
NESC recommendations that were communicated in September 2009, so the team compiled a list 
of clarifying answers to questions that were being asked by CPAS personnel.  This document of 
FAQs was not an NRB-approved product.  The assessment team conducted a meeting with the 
Project in December 2009 to discuss these questions.   
After the Project adopted IDAT recommended architecture, the assessment team assessed the 
impact to design reliability.  
The assessment team created a third outbrief of 33 findings, 20 observations, and 23 interim 
NESC recommendations.  These were approved by the NRB and outbriefed to Project 
stakeholders at JSC in April 2010. 
The assessment team put backup material in the outbrief including an example of reliability 
growth trending analysis and an example of the potential problems with one-factor-at-a-time 
testing. 
The stakeholder outbrief 3 and the two noted example items can be found in Appendix D. 
7.2  Final Analytical Assessment of CPAS Project Information 
This section provides a narrative summary of the team‘s assessment of Project information 
current at the end of the overall assessment period, in April 2010.   
Throughout the entire period of assessment review, the CPAS architecture was evolving.  During 
the third review period, a final architecture was selected based on recommendations from an 
IDAT chartered to resolve key CPAS integration issues.  Several outstanding interim NESC 
recommendations were addressed by this new architecture. 
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Included in this section are team assessments resulting in findings that support the final NESC 
recommendations in Section 8.0.  These recommendations were approved by the NRB prior to 
completion of the report and provided to Project stakeholders prior to the CPAS PDR in  
August 2010. 
7.2.1  Architecture 
7.2.1.1 Pack Volume Risks 
The volumetric requirements for any parachute system are driven by vehicle recovery weight, 
maximum deployment dynamic pressure, allowable packing density, materials used, and 
terminal descent velocity.  Higher vehicle weight or higher dynamic pressure would demand 
stronger and possibly larger parachutes, which in turn would demand more volume.  Once a 
parachute compartment volume has been allocated, it can be difficult to change the design to 
provide more volume in response to future demands. 
The CPAS Subsystem's PTRS specified that the CM was required to provide volume to ensure 
CPAS main parachute density was ≤ 38 lbm/ft³.  For the first two review periods, the projected 
main parachute pack density was between 43.7 and 54.2 lbm/ft³.   
There was consensus on the assessment team and across the wider parachute community that as 
parachute pack density increases, reliability risks also increase.  Risks include damage to 
hardware items and soft materials.  Damage to some parachute components can lead to parachute 
inflation malfunctions that cause loads to exceed design limit loads.  Damage to components can 
also cause them to fail at loads below design limit loads.  Either of these outcomes can result in 
catastrophic parachute system failures. 
Some parachute systems on emergency escape systems or unmanned weapons systems have 
successfully incorporated high-density parachute packs but these were not primary landing 
systems used on manned vehicles. 
During the Apollo Program ELS Block II development program, parachute performance 
requirements increased but the volume allocated to the main parachutes remained constant, 
resulting in increased packed density.  On the Apollo Program, increased rates of parachute 
component damage were observed in proportion to increases in pack density.  Innovative 
packing solutions with rigorous certification efforts and personnel training requirements were 
needed to mitigate these risks.  Functional verification could not be performed on these high-
density parachute systems during much of their manufacture, so rigorous, time-consuming, and 
costly manufacturing and installation practices were implemented. 
The Project should create and maintain a budgeting process for volume and pack density.  The 
volume assigned to CPAS in the CM forward bay should be cataloged as to gross dimensions, 
volume, shape, and draft.  This should include the space for all CPAS components, including but 
not limited to the main parachutes, drogues, pilot chutes, risers, bridles and associated hardware, 
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and any other systems stored in this volume.  A volume margin should be added and each design 
change proposed during development should be evaluated for impact to this budget.  The 
assessment team observed that virtually every escape or recovery parachute system experienced 
increases in weight requirements during development, including the Apollo Program ELS.  This 
history suggests that Orion CM weights will likely increase once the vehicle enters operation, 
making it necessary to continue to monitor the vehicle parachute compartment volumetric 
margins. 
The volume provided by the new CM OML described in Section 6.3.3 allowed the CPAS main 
pack shape to be simplified and the pack density to be reduced to below the required level.  
However, the assessment team assessed that the continued risk of future volume demands was 
improperly prioritized by the Project. 
 
F-1. The CPAS Project has not implemented a formal process to manage volume growth of 
components in the CM forward bay during design, development, evaluation, and 
operation.   
7.2.1.2 Roll Control Risks 
To reduce water-landing loads on the CM structure and its crew, the CM was to be oriented to a 
toe-forward orientation just prior to water landing.  To facilitate this, CPAS included a metallic 
torque reducer keeper that would deploy with the main parachutes and gather the main risers to a 
point above their single point attachment location on the CM.  This would allow a section of 
gathered risers to ‗twist up‘ and ‗untwist‘ with less than 450 ftlbf when the CM was suspended 
under its opened main parachutes.  With the roll torque limited as such, the CM RCS would have 
sufficient authority to roll the CM to an optimum water entry angle prior to landing. 
The assessment team assessed that deployment of a keeper on the CPAS main risers had no 
apparent design precedent and posed risks to CPAS reliability.  Extensive testing would be 
necessary to quantify these risks and demonstrate reliable function of this DFMR component. 
The assessment team thought that using the RCS while suspended on parachutes could also pose 
a risk of causing burning or oxidizing damage to parachute textile materials, especially at high 
CM angular rates and attitudes.  This was the suspected cause of one main parachute failure 
during descent of the Apollo 15 CM. 
In the course of discussing the inclusion of the keeper, the assessment team assessed other risks 
that may arise when using this method to achieve CM orientation relative to ground track 
heading.  To impact a wave slope in the necessary manner would require knowing and managing 
a number of variables in a short period of time near the water.  These variables would include the 
descent rate of the CM, the number of degrees of roll reorientation required, the target roll rate, 
the swing angle under the parachutes, the drift rate and direction, and the tolerance in the 
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heading.  Other possible variables associated with proximity to the water surface could include 
wind shears and gusts.   
A successful reorientation maneuver may also require a sophisticated sensing system to 
determine water surfaces conditions at touchdown for computation of the CM‘s terminal 
orientation requirement.  The assessment team knew of no precedent for this type of system.  It 
was not within the assessment team‘s scope of review to investigate onboard sensor system 
requirements.  
The assessment team concluded that the Orion Project should consider chartering an IDAT, 
perhaps delegated to the previous IDAT‘s successor, the Earth Landing System Functional 
Integration Team (ELS-FIT), to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the overall feasibility 
and ramifications of using the CM RCS to perform the function of reorientation of the CM prior 
to water landing.  
The IDAT should include representatives from the CM subsystems that interface with or are 
dependent on the RCS function, including CPAS.  The assessment should address the risks of 
inclusion of a deployable metallic keeper in CPAS and should also include an assessment of LRS 
verification plans. 
The IDAT assessment scope could include: 
 The overall feasibility and ramifications of using the RCS for touchdown roll control 
 Assessment of the risks (likelihood/consequence) versus benefits to CPAS and other 
subsystems 
 The impact of prohibiting the use of the RCS once the FBC panels are deployed 
 The impact of a requirement to not dump RCS fuel in any direction where heat, fuel, or 
oxidizer can reach any part of the parachute system  
 Inclusion of a deployable metallic torque limiter in CPAS 
 Design of the CM structure for water impact at worst-case combinations of water-surface 
conditions and vehicle-landing attitudes 
 The risks of landing with fuel in the RCS tanks 
 The effects of parachute oscillation  
 The ability to sense CM drift direction 
 The ability to sense water-surface conditions beneath the CM prior to landing  
 The methods to determine which heading to take to impact a dynamically changing wave 
slope just right  
 RCS command sequencing 
 The extent and complexity of an adequate development and certification plan for the RCS 
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F-2. Deployment of a torque reducer keeper on the CPAS main risers has no design 
precedent and poses risks to CPAS reliability.  Extensive testing will be necessary to 
quantify these risks and demonstrate reliable functionality. 
F-3. Using the CM RCS to orient the CM into a toe-forward position just prior to water 
landing is unprecedented and is an integrated issue that introduces risks to CPAS and 
the CM structure. 
7.2.2  PRA and Other Reliability Products 
7.2.2.1 PRA Estimation Methods 
At the first IDR in December 2008, a draft of the RAESR was presented that included a HA, 
FMEA, and FTA.  The RAESR provided a functional description of the system and 
decomposition based on the current architecture, which was immature at this time.  In addition, a 
PRA was presented that estimated catastrophic main parachute failure leading to LOC at 1 in 217 
without a statement of uncertainty. 
The PRA estimate was dominated by a failure mode seen in the SSP SRB historical development 
data that involved re-contact during parachute deployment.  During design evolution, the FTA 
and FMEA were updated in accordance with design changes.  The FMEA was used to track 
single point failures, which were briefed to the Project design team.  However, the NESC 
assessment team noted that reliability analyses were severely limited by a lack of appropriate test 
data to estimate the FTA probabilities.  In the following paragraphs, significant events in the 
reliability and PRA‘s evolution are highlighted. 
The assessment team had determined that the IDR-1 LOC estimate was invalid because the SSP 
SRB failure mode was not applicable to the CPAS architecture.  Consequently, the CPAS LOC 
estimate was considered not accurate and with great uncertainty.  The PRA also had gaps caused 
by a lack of valid test data on which failure estimates could be based.   
As the CPAS architecture evolved toward a system similar to the Apollo Program ELS during 
RP-3, additional data were sought from historical files from the ELS development program to 
use in the PRA.  At the end of the team‘s assessment, a significant amount of Apollo ELS data 
had been discovered but had not yet been integrated into the PRA. 
An EE activity was performed to fill the test data gaps and replace rough order of magnitude EJ 
estimates.  The EE was based on the architecture current at the time of the exercise.  It was 
intended to derive a relative ranking of potential failure modes from a small group of parachute 
system experts.   
The results of the EE were used in subsequent PRA LOC estimates.  Details of the EE are 
provided in Reference 9.  
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Because of the existing FTA‘s complexity and the rapidly changing design, a simplified FTA 
was developed at the request of the CPAS SE&I lead that was more ―interpretable‖ by design 
engineers to support design and development decisions.  This second FT attempted to capture 
higher-level functional failures rather than individual failure modes.  While this FT was more 
understandable by the Project design team, the original, more complex FT simultaneously was 
maintained during the assessment period and was used for ―official‖ PRA estimates. 
The Project provided results from the EE at IDR-3, but those data had not yet been incorporated 
into the PRA basic event estimates.  Five experts had participated.  Based on their answers a top 
system-level reliability was estimated to be 1:1,087.  Failure to deploy a main parachute (PRA 
input value #10) was estimated to be 1:231.  A large variance was reported in the component 
reliability values.  The Project reported that the experts would be asked to reexamine the 
resulting estimates as a sanity check.  The Project reported that inputs for PRA failure mode 
values were to be used to determine top system-level reliability. 
The failure probability estimate data derived from the 2009 EE exercise exhibited large variance 
that greatly limited its applicability for generating CPAS PRA input values.  The large variance 
was due mainly to the disagreement between the five experts involved in the study. 
The failure probability estimate data derived from the 2009 expert elicitation exercise are invalid 
for the Gen-2 architecture.  The Project is attempting to modify the EE results to account for 
changes in the Gen-2 architecture by removing a number of failure modes that are no longer part 
of this architecture.  The assessment team agreed that modification of the results in this manner 
would not lead to valid probability estimates for the Gen-2 architecture. 
The assessment team observed that the PRA appeared to be used principally for computing top-
level LOC estimates to communicate the Orion Project, but it also had influence on the 
development test plan, consistent with the Orion Project‘s risk-based approach.  This approach 
would use the PRA to define and prioritize risks and to define the resources required for testing.  
The assessment team considered this approach insufficiently comprehensive for a development 
effort.  For the Project‘s PRA/risk-based approach to succeed, all primary risks would have had 
to have been identified. 
As the FMEA evolved, critical failure modes and total failure modes were significantly reduced 
(see Table 7.2-1).  
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Table 7.2-1. Evolution of FMEA from RP-1 to RP-3 
FMEA December 2008: 
Criticality Amount 
1 145 
IR 17 
1R2 739 
1R3 110 
1R4 8 
Total: 1019 
FMEA September 2009: 
Criticality Amount  
1 2 
1R 0 
1R2 66 
1R3 0 
1R4 6 
Total: 74 
 
The reliability analyses, including the RAESR and PRA, were reviewed throughout the overall 
assessment period.  The assessment team found the traceability and veracity of the data 
consistently problematic, particularly in the input data to the PRA.  Estimated risks contained 
historical data, new test data, simulation, and EE results.  These sources were neither explicitly 
noted in the analyses nor communicated to the Orion Program.  The assessment team found 
inappropriate statistical distribution assumptions in both experimental and simulation data that 
rendered them either under- or over-conservative.  The assessment team also found early risk 
estimates with no statements of uncertainty, which did not support risk-informed decision-
making. 
The original PRA LOC estimates were found to be unsubstantiated due to the use of inapplicable 
SSP SRB data based on re-contact during deployment due to the dissimilarity between the CPAS 
and SRB architecture.   
The assessment team‘s analysis indicated that the lack of applicable test data presented a 
formidable challenge to obtaining adequate PRA estimates.   
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Consequently, the assessment team found that Apollo Program ELS data should be used for PRA 
inputs whenever appropriate (by similarity) and when available.  During the assessment, a cache 
of Apollo Program reports were discovered in a storage facility managed by NG.  These data will 
be more directly applicable to the current CPAS architecture and should improve PRA estimates. 
The assessment team reviewed the design and analysis of the EE exercise and found that the 
results were highly variable among the experts.  The methods employed appeared to assume that 
the elicited events were independent, whereas some were dependent.  The assessment team 
found that the experts were asked to compare events at disparate levels.  The large variability 
between the experts suggested lack of agreement and indicated problems with the elicitation 
protocol, including the events collection, their precise definition, and/or the analysis approach. 
The EE was based on an obsolete architecture.  The team assessed that deleting PRA failure 
events to attempt to model the current architecture would render the EE ranking invalid.  If 
another EE were to be conducted, a structured methodology such as an Analytical Hierarchy 
Process or a similar decision-ranking technique should be employed.  If another EE were to be 
conducted, the Project would benefit by seeking an EE discipline expert‘s assistance.     
 
F-4. Failure probability estimate data derived from the 2009 EE exercise exhibited a large 
variance, greatly limiting its usefulness for generating CPAS PRA input values. 
F-5. Failure probability estimate data derived from the 2009 EE exercise are invalid for the 
Gen-2 architecture. 
O-1. A large cache of Apollo Program ELS test and reliability reports has been located and 
is being retrieved by the Project.  Some of these data will be applicable for generating 
CPAS PRA input values because the ELS and the CPAS Gen-2 architectures are 
functionally similar. 
O-2. Top-level system failure probability estimates often are estimated or predicted prior to 
PDR, but tests and analyses ultimately must be performed to validate and reduce PRA 
input value uncertainties. 
7.2.2.2 Use of PRA Estimates for Design Decisions 
The impetus for initiating this NESC assessment was an unacceptably high LOC probabilistic 
risk estimate reported to the Orion Project.  This estimate, based erroneously on inapplicable SSP 
SRB data, was conveyed to CxP and CEV Project decision makers without a statement of 
uncertainty.  If the uncertainty regarding the data‘s inapplicability and lack of statistical 
confidence in the LOC point estimate had been communicated, more actionable information 
would have been provided to these decision-makers.  Proper communication of uncertainty, 
particularly for mission-critical parameters such as LOC, is imperative. 
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The methods used by the Project to generate the PRA input value failure probability estimates 
evolved considerably throughout the assessment.  Supporting data sources can include heritage 
test data or operational data, original test data, EJ, and EE.   
PRA is best utilized for optimizing the system‘s reliability.  Instead of simply generating a LOC 
number, PRA can provide a beneficial tool for improving system reliability.  PRA tasks are best 
completed with the intention and motivation for improving a system‘s reliability. 
The assessment team concluded that the Project should convey to top-level design decision 
makers that there presently are large uncertainties associated with the PRA estimates, caused by 
a complex and unique parachute design coupled with minimal field test data.  For PRA 
estimates, data sources (e.g., historical records, CPAS test, analysis, expert opinion), accuracy 
limitations, and relevance to the CPAS design must be communicated. 
 
O-3. The Project has used PRA input value failure probability estimates principally to 
compute the CPAS contribution to Orion LOC.  They have been used secondarily to 
help derive development test plans. 
 
F-6. CxP and CEV Project decision makers who have made risk-informed design decisions 
based on CPAS LOC estimates were not fully informed of the source of the underlying 
data used to generate them.  Top-level LOC uncertainties were communicated, but 
their method of derivation was not shown.  
7.2.3  Requirements, Testing, Analyses, and Verification Planning 
7.2.3.1 Requirements 
The first draft version of the CPAS PTRS, dated November 2008, was provided at IDR-1 in 
December 2008 [Ref. 7].  AS had received it only 2 months previously.  During the NESC 
assessment period the PTRS was revised once in May 2009.  A more substantial revision was 
still in progress at the end of the assessment in April 2010.  The Project indicated that interim 
NESC recommendations targeted to specific requirements would be incorporated into this 
version prior to PDR. 
At a top level, the assessment team determined that the PTRS (Rev. A) [Ref. 7] did not define 
pass/fail criteria quantitatively.  Moreover, it did not require an explicit statement of test 
suitability, assumptions, and/or statistical confidence in the test and/or simulation data and 
analysis.  Thus, the PTRS was ambiguous and did not support defining verification test 
resources.   
In colloquial terms, the PTRS did not state what needs to be known, how well it needs to be 
known, or how it will become known that it has been learned for relevant performance metrics 
necessary to recommend the system for flight operations. 
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For example, the format of the descent rate requirement could be stated as, ―The CPAS will 
ensure with XX percent statistical power at an effect size of X.X m/s that the CM will not exceed 
10.7 m/s.‖  Another example related to component strength might be stated as, ―The CPAS will 
ensure with 90-percent confidence that the 0.3-percentile (3 sigma) of the strength of component 
X exceeds X ft-lbs.‖   
These two examples support rigorously estimating test resources and provide a clear pass/fail 
metric to determine when a test objective has been met. 
 
F-7. The PTRS does not define quantitative pass/fail criteria, nor does it require an explicit 
statement of test suitability, assumptions, or statistical confidence in the test and/or 
simulation data and analysis. 
7.2.3.2 Development Test Plan 
The assessment team review of the CPAS Gen-1 test reports suggested that in 2007 and 2008 
there was no systematic process to establish the basis for and the conduct of testing.  The Apollo 
Program Experience Report–ELS, NASA TN D-7437, (1973), illustrated the great extent of 
testing that was necessary to demonstrate the overall ELS system reliability to verify its 
suitability for manned flight.  It also illustrated the need for thorough systems integration and 
compatibility verification.  The ELS Project adopted a comprehensive systems engineering 
approach to design, development, and testing to deliver a robust, reliable system. 
The assessment team reviewed the draft development test plan during RP-2.  It appeared to be a 
parachute-centric test plan, a continuation of the Gen-1 testing.  The assessment team decided 
that it was not a complete plan for demonstrating reliability of an integrated CPAS.  The tests in 
the matrix did not appear to have been derived with consideration of a functional decomposition 
of CPAS parts.  The tests showed an incomplete consideration of integrated performance of 
CPAS with other LRS components or with other CM subsystems.  
The test objectives in the CPAS development test matrix were derived principally from 
perceived or assumed system-level risks.  Risks in the development test matrix loosely but not 
completely reflected risks delineate in the constantly evolving FTAs and PRAs.  The assessment 
team observed that the risk severities used to rank test objectives were determined by consensus 
of the CPAS Project development test team. 
A risk-based testing approach has been successfully used during operation of the SSP and air 
transport systems to continuously improve system reliability and safety.  However, a number of 
issues can arise when applying this selective approach during a developmental program that has 
little to no recent experience or flight data.  It can be difficult to obtain pertinent failure data to 
formulate an accurate risk profile and there is a chance of overestimating or underestimating a 
given risk.  A top-down, risk-based testing approach also can fail to identify developmental 
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problems associated with process, material, workmanship, design errors, and interfaces.  These 
can seriously threaten system reliability and can adversely impact development schedules. 
Flight, ground, and subscale tests in the matrix were developed from the risk-based objectives.  
Flight-test configurations were created from parameters required to create test conditions (e.g., 
dynamic pressure, altitude, wing loading, wake, whether a representative parachute bay or FBC 
was required, etc.).  Unique test configurations were identified, test objectives were grouped, and 
notional test vehicles were assigned.  The flight test plan included main parachute performance 
evaluations of suspension line ratios, riser lengths, over-inflation control lines, and canopy 
porosity.  Sub-scale test series were designed to assess risks related to CPAS separation from the 
PTV.  The matrix included 16 drop tests in various configurations and at various altitudes, and 
nine ground tests. 
The assessment team‘s view was that the priority of a parachute developmental test program 
should be to obtain as much data and learn the strengths and weaknesses of various design 
options as quickly as possible without being subject to the rigors and controls associated with 
performing qualification or flight certification tests.  Concept feasibility tests should be 
conducted at the lowest level of sub-components possible.  As the architectural elements of a 
Project mature and requirements are better defined, more sophistication tests then can be 
conducted. 
The assessment team concluded that the CPAS development test plan had not been designed 
comprehensively and may not have been sufficient to obtain the required knowledge of system 
performance to mitigate the design risks.  While the plan was derived from perceived or assumed 
risks as assessed by the Project, it did not link to all risks and concerns identified by FTA, 
FMEA, and PRAs.  Some risks were sequestered to an ‗off-scope‘ status.  To adequately address 
these risks, priority should be given to those system elements identified by the FTA to have the 
highest uncertainties, thereby performing ―risk balancing.‖  The scope should include 
component-level verification tests to track compliance with requirements and mitigate or accept 
risks.  Furthermore, the plan should provide V&V of simulation models, which are relied on for 
performance estimation in the absence of physical test data. 
The assessment team assessed that the development test plan lacked precise objectives and 
success metrics that enabled clear decisions regarding when test objectives had been met.  
Uncertainty in performance metrics requires replication to assess experimental test variability.  
While some system parameters were replicated in the development plan, it exhibited 
confounding of multiple factors making it difficult to distinguish individual factor effects.  The 
development test matrix represented a fraction of all possible combinations, constrained by 
practicality, but it did not represent a strategic fraction derived to meet precise objectives. 
Given resource limitations and the complexity and highly integrated nature of CPAS, traditional, 
one-factor-at-a-time development testing may insufficiently assess performance factors, 
environmental factors, and interface interactions.  All of these can affect system reliability.  The 
assessment team concluded that a statistics-based DOE approach should be considered.  DOE 
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could provide an integrated, factorial test design to strategically and comprehensively plan the 
CPAS development tests.  Such an approach would at a minimum include defining: (1) precise, 
quantifiable test objectives; (2) required statistical confidence to support test results, linked to 
risks and consequences; and (3) mathematical justification of test methodology and resources to 
support objectives and provide required confidence. 
The DOE approach would also assist identifying what tests could be conducted for model 
validation, sub-system verification, and full-system verification and qualification. 
 
F-8. The CPAS ‘one-factor-at-a-time’ development test program will be less efficient in 
assessing performance, environmental factors, and interface interactions that could 
affect system reliability than could be possible using statistics-based DOE techniques.   
7.2.3.3 Ground Testing 
The assessment team determined that the test plan placed an inappropriately low emphasis on 
ground testing as an effective means for understanding and assessing top risks early in the 
development phase.  The assessment team concluded that four ground test programs were 
particularly needed at this time to mitigate risks associated with the following key events in the 
CPAS Con Ops:   
1. Main parachute pack retention and release.    
2. FBC panel jettison and trajectory.   
3. Pilot parachute interference or contact with a panel during deployment following an 
abort. 
4. Drogue parachute interference or contact with a panel during deployment following a 
nominal reentry. 
7.2.3.4 Main Pack Retention System 
The team assessed reliability risks with the main parachute pack retention system as it evolved 
throughout the assessment.  At the end of RP-3 the system relied on a series of daisy-chain loops 
to retain the main parachute d-bag to CM gussets and to react flight loads.  While this approach 
has been used successfully in other systems, including the Apollo Program, the assessment team 
thought that for CPAS the proposed method exhibited rigging complexity that introduced new 
risks of failed or delayed extraction of a main parachute pack. 
As described in Section 6.3.3, the retention system design would incorporate flaps that restrained 
the main parachute packs along the side edges and interfaced to the segment gusset walls.  The 
mechanism by which two pilot riser halves would impart forces to unzip their associated daisy-
chain loops appeared immature.  The riser halves would require one-for-one integration with 
each locking loop to pull each loop through its associated grommet.  There was an implied 
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assistance from the pilot chute risers to assist in the unzipping of the daisy chain without details.  
This concept had no apparent precedent and introduced development risk.  
There had been no demonstration of this proposed release method and no previous example 
shown.  The team assessed that there was substantial risk of abrasion and heat damage to the 
daisy-chain assembly, which could result in either failure to release or premature release of a 
main pack.  Either of these could result in a total main parachute malfunction.  The assessment 
team concluded that these risks should be retired by a series of demonstrations of the retention 
release function prior to in-flight full-system testing.  These tests could include the addition of 
abraded or thermally damaged daisy-chain loops, to fully evaluate the robustness of the design. 
At the end of RP-3, the main parachute d-bag concept contained a system of corsets and beckets 
on the outer surface to support the convex-curved upper-outer edge of the main parachute pack.  
As the main parachute pack density increased during development, it became more difficult for 
the parachute retention system to retain the outer surface shape of the d-bag through the total 
mission environmental cycle.  The assessment team assessed that it will be imperative for the 
retention system to maintain the clearance between the outer surface of the d-bag and the inner 
surface of the FBC.  Inertial and vibration forces may shift a pack in its retention system, altering 
its top and outer surfaces and particularly affecting its curved upper-outer edge.  Such movement 
or distortion could allow contact of the d-bag with the FBC IML, consequently damaging 
parachute components or the airbags that jettison the FBC panels.   
The assessment team noted that the CxP Ares 1-X recovery parachute failure investigators 
determined that a contributing cause of that failure was premature activation of a first stage 
parachute reefing line cutter, possibly from excessive movement in the parachute pack during 
flight prior to deployment.  Ground tests can help ensure the adequacy of a main cutter actuation 
system against design load safety margins, and this can preclude premature reefing line cutter 
initiation during packing, transport, or flight, while ensuring actuation during the dynamic 
conditions of deployment.  Cutter design should include a method to detect a premature firing at 
least to the point of installation. 
The assessment team concluded that the Project‘s planned ground test was insufficient to address 
the identified risks.  The Project should conduct ground tests to assess the viability of the main 
pack retention system early in the development effort, using a representative parachute 
compartment and parachute system.  Testing should include ground static, thermal, inertial, 
shock, and vibration loads as part to any evaluation.  The ability of the retention system to 
securely hold the CPAS components in place should be evaluated during these tests, including 
but not limited to, preventing gross movement and contact with the FBC IML.  The effect on 
internal components such as the reefing line cutters should also be evaluated. 
 
F-9. The ground test portion of the Project’s development test matrix insufficiently 
addresses risks associated with the main parachute pack retention and release system.   
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7.2.3.5 Forward Bay Cover 
The assessment team assessed that the Project decision to segment the FBC into six airbag-
jettisoned panels was made with limited consideration of key consequential aspects.  Among 
these were effectiveness of the multiple panel design, fail-safe requirement, airbag load reaction 
on the packed main parachutes, panel separation line features, volumetric requirements, and 
panel release velocity uncertainties.  The assessment team observed that multi-body trajectory 
analyses were not conducted of dispersed relative trajectories of the panels, drogue chutes, pilot 
chutes, main chutes, or other liberated components. 
The team assessed that the change from a monolithic FBC to the six-panel configuration 
introduced additional complexity and failure modes.  Project analyses of the risks and 
consequences of unsuccessful panel jettison due to either MDC or airbag failure were not shown.  
A failure of one or more of the panels to jettison may result in the improper deployment; failure 
to deploy; or damage to the drogue, pilot, or main parachutes or to associated risers, bridles, or 
CMUS components.  It was not shown if retained panels were designed to break away by drogue 
or pilot parachute deployment as a back-up mode of jettison.  
The team assessed that the jettison airbag system that was intended to thrust the individual panels 
away from the CM imposed additional complexity and sources of risk.  One Project briefing 
indicated that each airbag would exert 32 psi over an area of 59 in
2
 on the face of the main 
parachute pack.  This would result in a total force of almost 1,900 pounds.  
Airbag forces applied against the face of a main parachute pack assembly would represent a 
hazard to the deployment bag, its contents, and its retention system, possibly leading to damage 
to the main parachute components or premature release by rupturing the securing system.  
Airbag forces applied against the face of the drogue mortars could cause failure of the cover 
shear pins, leading to premature release of the drogue parachute.  The addition of an airbag push-
off structure in the sixth forward bay sector may introduce riser entanglement risks. 
The use of individual airbags required interconnection to redundant pressure source for inflation, 
and redundant initiation.  This multiplied the source of risk of failure.  The airbags were shown 
to be attached directly to the panels, putting them at risk of thermal damage during reentry.  As 
of the end of RP-3, no ground tests had been conducted to demonstrate the function or robustness 
of the panel jettison design.  
The assessment team assessed that the risk and consequences of near-field contact and far-field 
contact of the FBC panels and parachutes had not been rigorously considered.  Initial trajectories 
and motions of panels would be sensitive to variations inherent in several closely sequenced 
initial events, including MDC detonation events, initiation of airbag inflation, rate of airbag 
inflation, and push-off force. 
During descent after reentry, a short-time interval was planned between FBC panels‘ jettison and 
drogue mortars‘ firing to reduce the risk of CM angular-rate buildup.  The assessment team 
considered that this may introduce the risk of a drogue parachute being fired into and contacting 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
08-00487 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
CEV Parachute Assembly System Independent  
Design Reliability Assessment 
Page #: 
92 of 109 
 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-08-00487 
a jettisoned panel.  Following an abort, a short-time interval was planned between FBC panels‘ 
jettison and pilot mortars‘ firing to reduce the risk of CM angular-rate buildup.  The assessment 
team considered that this might introduce a risk of a pilot parachute being fired into and 
contacting a jettisoned panel.  
The assessment team concluded that panel jettison airbags must provide positive separation of all 
six panels from the CM, driving them outside the deployment radius of any of the parachutes and 
setting them on flight paths that would not intercept the CM or its parachutes.  Jettison might 
occur in a complex air stream that was highly dependent upon capsule orientation relative to the 
wind vector.  Based on part count, the probability of any one jettisoned panel contacting a 
parachute might be greater than the probability of a single monolithic cover contacting a 
parachute. 
The team determined that panel ballistic coefficients could exhibit a wide range and that this 
could require a complex analyses and certification program that might introduce schedule risks.   
The assessment team concluded that early in the development effort, the Project should validate 
the aerodynamic trajectory analysis by conducting a series of appropriate wind-tunnel, ground, 
and flight tests.  These may include subjecting a family of test panels (ones that envelope a "best-
guess" range of panel dimensions) to vertical wind-tunnel testing or free fall from an aircraft as 
well as investigating panels with variously deflated jettison airbags in this same manner.  This 
would allow the characterization of the panels‘ drag in various stability modes.  This data could 
then be coupled with the variation of the airbag thrust vector and airflow around the CM at off-
nominal attitudes to develop full, 3D, multi-body, Monte Carlo trajectory analyses of the FBC 
panels relative to the CM and various parachute components.  The resulting dispersion patterns 
of the FBC panels, CM, and parachute components could then be more comprehensively 
assessed. 
7.2.3.6 Parachute Near-Field Contact during Deployment 
The assessment team observed that the forward bay sectors in which each main pack was stowed 
were geometrically more restrictive than were the Apollo Program ELS stowage bays.  This was 
reasoned to increase the risk (relative to the ELS) of extraction hindrance.  The CPAS forward 
bay gusset geometry provided a 60-degree sweep of unhindered extraction, compared to 90 
degrees for the ELS.  In addition, the ramp on the upper back side of the three CPAS main  
d-bags would hinder upward extraction above the angle of the ramp.  Main pack contact with 
CM structure during extraction could result in a failure to be extracted, a delay in extraction, or 
damage during extraction.  
The team assessed that the previously noted low-fidelity characterization of FBC panel 
trajectories also posed a risk following a nominal reentry, of near-field contact of a drogue 
parachute fired directly into a recently released panel that had insufficiently cleared the space in 
front of the mortar.  This same risk may exist following an abort, for a pilot parachute fired 
directly into a released panel that had insufficiently cleared the space in front of the mortar.  
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The team assessed that a series of ground tests should be conducted early in the development 
effort to demonstrate and assess the viability of extracting CPAS components.  This testing 
should include ground static loads, inertia loads, shock, and vibration conditioning as described 
in Section 7.1.3.  The extraction tests should include a series of static and dynamic strip tests 
where the d-bag is pulled at various angles on a representative forward bay mock-up.  The pull 
angle selected should attempt to induce the worse possible interference or snag hazard to the  
d-bag as it is extracted.  The d-bag should be extracted out and dragged across the outer surface 
of the CM at all possible angles.  Snag hazards should be identified and documented as to their 
severity and risk.  Relative extraction risks associated with geometric differences between CPAS 
and ELS should be assessed if ELS test data are applied in the CPAS PRA.    
 
F-10. The ground test portion of the Project’s development test matrix insufficiently 
addresses risks associated with the FBC panel jettison system and trajectories of 
released panels.  
 
F-11. The ground test portion of the Project’s development test matrix insufficiently 
addresses risks associated with near-field contact or interference of main parachutes 
with CM structure during deployment. 
 
F-12. The ground test portion of the Project’s development test matrix insufficiently 
addresses risks associated with near-field contact or interference of pilot or drogue 
parachutes with FBC panels during deployment.  
7.2.3.7 Modeling and Simulation 
The key analyses reviewed during the NESC CPAS independent review were taken primarily 
from the IDR, IDAT products, and various meetings, including CPAS SE&I, Hardware IPT, and 
MVP meetings.   
The use of DCLDYN as the primary simulation tool for CPAS implied that it had undergone a 
V&V to ensure accurate modeling of the various trajectory phases.  V&V approaches typically 
require extensive ground and flight tests to collect data to verify simulation accuracy.  The test 
data collected and its associated uncertainty must be considered when formulating a model to 
simulate performance.  Since flight tests cannot cover every expected flight regime, simulation is 
a key element in verifying any system across its expected operating ranges for flight.  The 
assessment team determined that DCLDYN validation regarding its use in design decisions 
would be crucial in CPAS system design for its operational phases. 
DCLDYN used Monte Carlo simulation to generate CPAS system results across various 
operating conditions including pad abort, ascent abort, and nominal re-entry.  During the IDR 
meetings, DCLDYN was described as a two-body simulation that allows for three degrees of 
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freedom (DOF) of each body in the vertical, horizontal, and pitch plane.  The two bodies are 
connected by a non-linear spring, which represents the parachute structure.  This model‘s 
validity was not apparent during the IDR regarding past use and verification with other model 
developers (i.e., verifying that the Orion aero-database was correctly implemented).  The 
assessment team assessed that the validation of the DCLDYN simulation tool with regard to 
accurate performance predictions was a key missing element. 
Reviewing other simulations being used in Orion development, the common number of DOF per 
body are three translational and three rotational in an inertial reference frame (six DOF).  
Rotational DOF are important for modeling capsule aerodynamic effects as well as the dynamic 
interactions between the capsule and parachute system.  Techniques and assumptions used in 
building DCLDYN models account for only two translational DOF and one rotational DOF.  
From the IDR-3 presentation charts, the drogue design loads were seen to increase due to vehicle 
dynamics modeling in DCLDYN.  Applicability of Orion models to DCLDYN therefore needs to 
be reviewed such that key characteristics and limitations of the missing DOF are understood and 
conveyed to decision makers. 
At the beginning of the NESC‘s review, it was not recognized whether there was an independent 
V&V effort for DCLDYN.  During the time of the review, another simulation called DSS was 
seen to predict parachute performance well for the Gen-1 testing.  By the end of the review, an 
independent V&V role was seen to occur between DSS and DCLDYN.  This addressed a key 
interim recommendation made near the beginning of the NESC review to use validated models.   
Other analysis tools being used for CPAS design should also be V&V for their respective uses.  
For example, it was not clear that the tool used for an IDAT analysis of FBC segments far-field 
re-contact was valid for the type of study conducted.  Specific assumptions and Monte Carlo 
parameters were not identified.  The NASA Standard 7009, ―Standard for Models and 
Simulations,‖ would help the Project to V&V their tools for specific studies and help inform the 
responsible decision makers of results applicability and associated uncertainty [see  
Reference 10]. 
7.2.3.8 Uncertainty Analysis of Simulation Results 
The modeling parameters used in DCLDYN for the parachute Monte Carlo analysis directly 
affect the design loads used to design and construct CPAS.  The PTRS indicated that parachute 
loads were to be limited to a specified sigma level (meaning, by inference, variation about a 
mean value).  An appropriate definition of ―sigma‖ was missing from the PTRS and was 
therefore left open to interpretation.  From the DCLDYN results, only a sigma number, which 
was thought to assume a normal distribution, was presented at the IDR as the design-to-number 
for the parachute loads.  No presentation of the type of resultant distribution (e.g., histograms, 
quantile-to-quantile, cumulative distribution functions, etc.) was given from the Monte Carlo 
data, nor was a confidence level associated with that result.  From the IDR slides, uniformly 
distributed numbers were used for the inputs, therefore implying the possibility of uniformly 
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distributed outputs.  The team assessed that a sigma number (assuming normally distributed data) 
would not be adequate to characterize the parachute load performance due to the inputs used and 
that more statistical rigor would be needed to better understand the results in support of decision 
making. 
7.2.3.9 Clustered Parachute Modeling 
The CPAS parachute system is composed of a set of drogue, pilot, and main parachutes working 
as a clustered system.  Uncertainty in deployment, inflation, and other environmental factors can 
cause different opening loads between parachutes.  Understanding the load sharing is necessary 
in designing margin into the design. 
The parachute model employed by DCLDYN does not allow modeling of multiple parachutes.  
Instead a single parachute model must be contrived to have the same full open drag area and 
representative opening times as any desired cluster.  The partitioning of the load between 
individual chutes in the cluster is then estimated through the use of an assumed load-sharing 
factor.  For the CPAS design this has been derived from a limited set of past empirical data.  This 
load-sharing factor was derived from Apollo Program test data and is a ratio of 65/35 for two 
parachutes and 50/25/25 for three parachutes.  Using this load-share factor, the design limit loads 
for an individual parachute were specified to be greater for a two-chute drogue deploy than a 
single drogue deploy (34.2 versus 24.1 klbf) and similar for the three-chute mains (34.8 klbf).  
The team assessed that this load-sharing approach may be driving excessive conservatism in the 
design and could be better understood by developing a multi-body simulation that can model 
individual parachutes in a cluster.  By developing this capability, the load share can be better 
understood and applied to the design effort.  
 
F-13. CxP and CEV Project decision makers who have made risk-informed design decisions 
based on Project analysis results may not have recognized that key CPAS tools and 
models were not V&V for this application, nor may they have realized the amount of 
uncertainty in the analyses results. 
7.2.3.10 Master Verification Plan 
At the first IDR in December 2008, presentations were made on the embryonic work toward the 
development of a test and verification plan.  By mid 2009, a MVP development was begun in 
earnest and a Project team was formed.  The process employed to develop the MVP is shown in 
Figure 6.5-3.  In October 2009, the Project MVP team augmented its membership to include a 
statistician trained in statistical DOE.  MVP development continued until December 2009, at 
which time the MVP process was reduced to a low priority to focus on the PTRS revision.  The 
re-prioritized focus on the PTRS revision emphasized the vital inter-relationship between the 
MVP and PTRS. 
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The Project generated a V&V document to address the Project‘s system integration needs and 
requirements.  This document was intended to provide minimum acceptable verification success 
criteria, general information concerning the verification methods and resource requirements, and 
a link to the final verification evidence.  The CPAS Certification Plan was used to define the 
detailed tools and resources, schedules, and inter-relationships needed to support successful 
system certification.  The V&V matrix referenced in the V&V document and generated for PDR 
was the typical matrix in spreadsheet form showing success criteria and verification method.  
However, this spreadsheet lacked the fidelity and interconnectivity required for such a large and 
complex system as CPAS.   
The Project‘s answer to the complex integration issue was to develop a MVP that captured the 
individual VA.  Each requirement addressed in the PTRS may generate multiple VAs.  VAs may 
generate multiple analyses and tests.  A VA concept was authored by the Project to address the 
issues: types of analyses required, where the information to support these analyses would come 
from (e.g., test, inspections, etc.), identification of other activities supported by the same 
analysis, and the different analyses needed to be performed.  This VA concept identified the 
relationships between activities, enabled better scheduling and planning of analysis and testing 
resources, and allowed for impact assessments for changes or delays caused by predecessor 
activities.  The Project recognized that the verification plan must be started early in the design 
process and be complete by the Critical Design Review.  The Project also recognized that the VA 
concept should be extended to include development testing and analysis, not just verification 
tests and analyses.    
The CPAS SE&I team presented the MVP concept to the IPTs and to CEV Project Management.  
Expectations (ground rules) for the VAs, roles and responsibilities of participating organizations 
and work groups, and the review/approval process were discussed during a kickoff meeting.  
VAs were developed using the following hierarchy: 
1. CPAS PTRS is the parent document. 
2. CPAS V&V document defines the success criteria from the PTRS as Verification 
Requirements (VRs). 
3. VAs are derived from VRs.  Each VR will have at least one VA.  However, in many 
cases, each VR will produce multiple VAs.  A VA can produce other VAs to attain 
missing/insufficient data to complete the parent VA.  
While a VA is under review by the IPTs, System Integration, and CEV Project Management, it is 
considered a candidate VA.  Once approved by the stakeholders, the VA is moved to ―accepted‖ 
and entered into CRADLE
™
.   
The assessment team determined that while the MVP process to trace test requirements to the 
PTRS was rigorous, a lack of clarity in the PTRS (previously discussed) resulted in an inordinate 
use of resources discussing precisely what would satisfy PTRS requirements.  In addition, there 
appeared to be a disproportionate focus on system-level flight tests, due to the cost and schedule 
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constraints, rather than a systematic approach to integrate, and exploit, ground-testing 
capabilities. 
As ―a chain is only as strong as its weakest link,‖ CPAS system reliability and crew safety is 
dictated by its weakest building block or component.  The most important goal of CPAS 
verification, or any verification, should be finding the weakest link or potential weak links from 
the many building blocks and processes aggregated into a single system.   
Based on reviewing CPAS testing and verification planning documents provided, it was clear the 
Project sought to achieve this goal by utilizing systems tools to identify and selectively mitigate 
the weak links based on their risk outcome(s).  However, this targeted verification approach is 
most effective when it is used in parallel with a component-based verification plan that covers 
system components.  The central theme was to create a complete CPAS verification data picture 
of a functional verification matrix to effectively manage the VA while avoiding any weak or 
missing links and eliminating any unnecessary duplication. 
An example of the functional verification matrix and possible contents in the matrix are 
described as: 
 Systematically decompose the CPAS subsystem into its components and their 
functions, including all functions that lead to factors which can influence CPAS 
performance. 
 Identify interface components (from other subsystems) that may influence CPAS 
performance, and their functions. 
 Identify environmental factors that can influence component performance. 
 Identify any unique handling, processing, and inspection requirements.   
 Include all risks and concerns identified by FTA, FMEA, and PRA.   
 Derive verification parameters traceable to requirements, risks, and operations 
concepts. 
 Derive an inclusive list of candidate verification tasks (analyses, tests, inspections, 
and demonstrations) that rigorously trace back to risk analyses, component functional 
analyses, requirements, and operations concepts. 
 Cross check the existing development plan and the draft verification plan to reveal 
potentially unidentified verification tasks that will be necessary to certify the system 
for human-rated flight. 
In summary, the assessment team determined that the draft MVP appeared to emphasize aerial 
drop tests over ground tests.  Instead of a bottoms-up test and verification approach, CPAS was 
more focused on system-level drop tests.  The assessment team found that system-level drop 
tests represented a small proportion of the full suite of testing capabilities that could be leveraged 
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to achieve successful verification.  VAs should be performed at the lowest level possible and 
built up to mitigate risks and control external effects.  For example, the riser assembly 
mechanical strength qualification can be done as a component-level test versus during an all-up 
system drop test.    
For the MVP, the assessment team determined that a test matrix based on the most probable 
worst-case flight conditions and environmental factors (on a bad day/worst case) should be 
developed.  The MVP should state these conditions in reporting results and flight should be 
restricted to those conditions which have been validated and verified.  While the Project seeks to 
―test as you fly and fly as you test,‖ the assessment team recognized that it is often impractical to 
develop a test matrix to encompass all external environmental variables and interactions between 
its sub-assembly components, especially for a system as complex as CPAS.  Under these 
circumstances, DOE can be employed to systematically sample the multi-dimensional test space 
that is both broad and deep.  In addition, DOE seeks to maximize the amount of information 
obtained from the entire test program, rather than sub-optimizing for individual tests.  Due to the 
resource constraints on CPAS, the assessment team recommended employing DOE in all testing 
levels (component to flight) to optimally allocate resources for requirement verification. 
 
F-14. The draft MVP was appropriately immature during the pre-PDR period of assessment. 
The draft underemphasized ground tests. 
 
O-4. Verification activities should be performed at the lowest level possible and built up to 
mitigate risks and control external effects.  A verification plan that is not 
comprehensively derived from a full inventory of component functional requirements 
may fail to identify failure modes that were not observed on heritage hardware or on 
previous tests on development hardware. 
 
O-5. A verification matrix that is based on the most probable worst-case flight conditions 
and environmental factors (worst case/bad day) is ideal, but would be impractical for a 
verification matrix of a system as complex as CPAS to encompass external 
environmental variables and interactions between its sub-assembly components.  
Statistical DOE techniques can systematically sample a multi-dimensional test space in 
a manner that is both broad and deep, and can maximize the amount of information 
obtained from an entire test program, rather than sub-optimizing individual tests. 
7.2.4  Organizational Complexity Impact on Systems Integration 
The assessment team assessed that the structure of the organization of which the Project was a 
part, may pose integration risks that adversely impact CPAS reliability.  The partition of Orion 
hardware and the contractual roles and responsibilities are described in Section 6.6.   
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The Project was responsible for drogue, pilot, and main parachutes; their suspension lines, risers, 
and deployment bags; confluence fittings (if any); the torque reducing keeper; and other ancillary 
components.  The Orion Project‘s lead contractor, LM, was responsible for several other 
components critical to CPAS reliability, including drogue and pilot mortars, riser cutters, the 
fairlead fitting, and auxiliary parachute guns (if any).  LM was also responsible for the 
integration of CPAS into the larger LRS, which included the CMUS.  LM was also responsible 
for integrating the LRS into the CM and for module features that were critical for CPAS 
reliability, including the FBC and its jettison system, and the forward bay gussets and tunnel. 
The assessment team‘s understanding was that design development and test data were to be 
provided by AS to the Project, through its contract with Jacobs ESCG.  The parachute system 
would ultimately be provided by NASA to LM as GFE.  AS did not have a production contract 
for CPAS at the time of this review.  
The team assessed that AS brought valuable expertise to the Project.  However, the assessment 
team thought that the complexity of the organization structure complicated the definition and 
ease of change of subsystems interface control documents (ICDs) and that certifying the 
integrated LRS would be less cost effective.  Most significantly, the team assessed that the 
complex reporting lines, roles, and responsibilities arising from CPAS being GFE might pose 
risks to designing a well-integrated and reliable subsystem. 
During the Apollo Program, the ELS organization was responsible for the total upper deck ICD, 
allowing control of anything that could affect or interfere with parachute function.   
The team assessed that the unconventional separation of the CPAS drogue and pilot mortars from 
CPAS introduced a significant integration risk.  Successful drogue and pilot parachute 
deployment will depend on key elements of mortar design, and inevitable changes in parachute 
design during development may critically affect mortar performance.  Historically, single 
entity/design organization were employed for development of human-rated landing recovery 
systems to more readily accommodate changes in either the mortars or the parachutes and to 
facilitate a more efficient development and certification testing effort. 
The assessment team thought throughout the assessment period that the organizational 
complexity introduced risks through the miscommunication of requirements or other critical 
design information.  These risks could be mitigated by aggressive application of systems 
engineering best practices.  One requirement of systems engineering is an organizational 
breakdown structure with defined roles and responsibilities.   
The assessment team also was concerned that the complexity of the reporting structure (AS-
Jacobs ESCG-NASA-LM) and the complex systems of boards and panels (GEMCP, ERB, etc.) 
with varying authority to approve or advise would introduce additional integration risks and 
hinder progress during development, validation, and certification. 
The assessment team believed that the design of a robust and reliable CPAS and its integration 
into LRS would require ongoing discussions and iterative design trades with other CM 
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subsystems throughout the development process.  The team assessed early in the assessment 
period that CPAS would benefit from the creation of a Phase Lead or a Phase Team who would 
report to the SE&I team chair, with the principal responsibility of assessing CPAS component 
interfaces with other systems.  An interim NESC recommendation in April 2009 was for such an 
entity to  
―Have broad-reaching authority to assess design changes for their effect on other 
systems that interface with CPAS, and for the effect those other systems have on 
CPAS, regardless of the interfaced system ownership.  This (lead or team) should 
also coordinate the review and distribution of changes by the appropriate 
Technical Authority (TA) for each affected organization.‖  {Interim R-9, 
Appendix B}. 
The assessment team felt that the creation of the IDAT in June 2009 addressed this 
recommendation.  The success of the IDAT in resolving several CPAS integration issues proved 
its effectiveness. 
 
F-15. The nontraditional roles and responsibilities for development of components that are 
critical to reliable function of CPAS, but are not a part of CPAS, poses integration and 
communication challenges that may introduce unrecognized reliability risks to CPAS. 
 
O-6. Risks arising from the nontraditional division of roles and responsibilities between the 
CPAS Project, LM, AS, and Jacobs ESCG have not been identified.  
 
O-7. Concerted application of systems engineering best practices will be essential to reduce 
the increased risk posed by the nontraditional division of roles and responsibilities 
between the CPAS Project, LM, AS, and Jacobs ESCG.   
After the IDAT was disbanded, the Orion Project formed the ELS-FIT with a charter to ensure 
that future design decisions will reflect integrated solutions.  The assessment team was 
encouraged by this action which indicated that the risks associated with organizational 
complexity were generally recognized by the Project and that systems engineering practices 
would be employed in an effort to manage those risks. 
The assessment team recognized that the Orion Project‘s multi-element organization was 
unlikely to be contractually simplified.  The team therefore created an Agency lesson learned for 
future NASA space vehicle development programs with human-rated parachute recovery 
systems.  
 
LL-1. NASA space vehicle development programs with human-rated parachute recovery 
systems should make a single organization fully responsible and accountable for the 
design, development, integration, and certification (DDI&C) of the deceleration and 
landing systems.  This responsibility should encompass all participating subsystems 
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that can affect the reliability of the integrated descent and landing system.  Such an 
approach to DDI&C could have utility for other tightly coupled spacecraft systems of 
systems on which crew lives are critically dependant on reliable function. 
8.0 Findings, Observations, and NESC Recommendations 
8.1 Findings 
The following final findings were identified: 
F-1. The CPAS Project has not implemented a formal process to manage volume growth of 
components in the CM forward bay during design, development, evaluation, and 
operation.   
F-2. Deployment of a torque reducer keeper on the CPAS main risers has no design precedent 
and poses risks to CPAS reliability.  Extensive testing will be necessary to quantify these 
risks and demonstrate reliable functionality. 
F-3. Using the CM RCS to orient the CM into a toe-forward position just prior to water 
landing is unprecedented and is an integrated issue that introduces risks to CPAS and the 
CM structure. 
F-4. Failure probability estimate data derived from the 2009 EE exercise exhibited a large 
variance, greatly limiting its usefulness for generating CPAS PRA input values. 
F-5. Failure probability estimate data derived from the 2009 EE exercise are invalid for the 
Gen-2 architecture. 
F-6. CxP and CEV Project decision makers who have made risk-informed design decisions 
based on CPAS LOC estimates were not fully informed of the source of the underlying 
data used to generate them.  Top-level LOC uncertainties were communicated but their 
method of derivation was not shown.  
F-7. The PTRS does not define quantitative pass/fail criteria, nor does it require an explicit 
statement of test suitability, assumptions, or statistical confidence in the test and/or 
simulation data and analysis. 
F-8. The CPAS ‗one-factor-at-a-time‘ development test program will be less efficient in 
assessing performance, environmental factors, and interface interactions that can affect 
system reliability than could be possible using statistics-based DOE techniques.   
F-9. The ground test portion of the Project‘s development test matrix insufficiently addresses 
risks associated with the main parachute pack retention and release system.   
F-10. The ground test portion of the Project‘s development test matrix insufficiently addresses 
risks associated with the FBC panel jettison system and trajectories of released panels. 
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F-11. The ground test portion of the Project‘s development test matrix insufficiently addresses 
risks associated with near-field contact or interference of main parachutes with CM 
structure during deployment. 
F-12. The ground test portion of the Project‘s development test matrix insufficiently addresses 
risks associated with near-field contact or interference of pilot or drogue parachutes with 
FBC panels during deployment. 
F-13. CxP and CEV Project decision makers who have made risk-informed design decisions 
based on Project analysis results may not have recognized that key CPAS tools and 
models were not V&V for this application, nor may they have realized the amount of 
uncertainty in the analyses results. 
F-14. The draft MVP was appropriately immature during the pre-PDR period of assessment.  
The draft underemphasized ground tests. 
F-15. The nontraditional roles and responsibilities for development of components that are 
critical to reliable function of CPAS but are not a part of CPAS, pose integration and 
communication challenges that may introduce unrecognized reliability risks to CPAS. 
8.2 Observations 
The following final observations were identified: 
O-1. A large cache of Apollo Program ELS test and reliability reports has been located and is 
being retrieved by the Project.  Some of these data will be applicable for generating 
CPAS PRA input values because the ELS and the CPAS Gen-2 architectures are 
functionally similar. 
O-2. Top-level system failure probability estimates often are estimated or predicted prior to 
PDR, but tests and analyses ultimately must be performed to validate and reduce PRA 
input value uncertainties. 
O-3. The Project has used PRA input value failure probability estimates principally to compute 
the CPAS contribution to Orion LOC.  They have been used secondarily to help derive 
development test plans. 
O-4. Verification activities should be performed at the lowest level possible and built up to 
mitigate risks and control external effects.  A verification plan that is not 
comprehensively derived from a full inventory of component functional requirements 
may fail to identify failure modes that were not observed on heritage hardware or on 
previous tests on development hardware. 
O-5. A verification matrix that is based on the most probable worst-case flight conditions and 
environmental factors (worst case/bad day) is ideal but would be impractical for a 
verification matrix of a system as complex as CPAS to encompass external 
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environmental variables and interactions between its sub-assembly components.  
Statistical DOE techniques can systematically sample a multi-dimensional test space in a 
manner that is both broad and deep and can maximize the amount of information 
obtained from an entire test program, rather than sub-optimizing individual tests. 
O-6. Risks arising from the nontraditional division of roles and responsibilities between the 
CPAS Project, LM, AS, and Jacobs ESCG have not been identified. 
O-7. Concerted application of systems engineering best practices will be essential to reducing 
the increased risk posed by the nontraditional division of roles and responsibilities 
between the CPAS Project, LM, AS, and Jacobs ESCG.   
8.3 NESC Recommendations 
The following final NESC recommendations are directed toward the CPAS Project unless 
otherwise indicated and were of the top-most concern to the assessment team at the conclusion of 
its assessment.  The final NESC recommendations are all reiterations or enhanced restatements 
of interim NESC recommendations, which are noted parenthetically for reference.  Interim 
NESC recommendations R-1 through R-30, their foundational findings and observations, and 
additional supporting material can be found in Appendix B.  Interim NESC recommendations R-
31 and R-32 can be found in Appendix C.  Interim NESC recommendations R-33 through R-55 
can be found in Appendix D. 
R-1. Create a volume budget with volume margins for the CM forward bay; maintain it 
throughout the DDT&E effort; and continue to maintain it as design improvements are 
made after the CM becomes operational.  (F-1), {interim R-3} 
R-2. The Orion Project (or the delegated ELS-FIT) should conduct a comprehensive 
assessment of the overall feasibility and ramifications of using the CM RCS to perform 
the function of reorientation of the CM prior to water landing.  (F-2, F-3), {interim R-41} 
 Include representatives from CM subsystems (including CPAS) who interface with or 
are dependent on the RCS function. 
 Include an assessment of LRS certification plans.  
R-3. Discontinue using results from the 2009 expert elicitation exercise for generating 
PRA/LOC estimates until failure estimates are revised to reflect the current architecture 
and the cause of the large variability seen in the data from that exercise can be rectified; 
utilize applicable data from the geometrically similar Apollo Program ELS to generate 
estimates for applicable failure estimates or conduct tests and analyses to generate new 
PRA data.  (F-4, F-5, O-1, O-2), {interim R-14, R-45, R-46}   
R-4. Convey to CxP and CEV Project decision makers the source of all data and an estimate of 
its uncertainty, when generating post-PDR PRA input value failure probability estimates 
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to be used to show the CPAS contribution to Orion LOC.  (F-6, O-3), {interim R-6,  
R-42}   
R-5. Revise requirements in the PTRS to include verifiable pass/fail metrics.  (F-7), {interim 
R-53} 
R-6. Re-plan post-PDR development testing and analyses activities strategically and 
comprehensively.   Consider using statistical DOE techniques to maximize efficient 
resource utilization.  (F-8), {interim R-5, R-31} 
R-7. Consider inclusion of the following ground tests early in the post-PDR development plan 
to obtain data on risks associated with key events in the CPAS Con Ops:   
o Main parachute pack retention and release.  (F-9, F-14), {interim R-38, R-39}   
o FBC panel jettison and trajectory.  (F-10, F-14), {interim R-34, R-36} 
o Main parachute interference or contact with CM structure during extraction.     
(F-11, F-14), {interim R-37}   
o Drogue parachute interference or contact with an FBC panel during deployment 
following nominal reentry.  (F-10, F-12, F-14), {interim R-10, R-33}   
o Pilot parachute interference or contact with an FBC panel during deployment 
following an abort.  (F-10, F-12, F-14), {interim R-10, R-33}     
R-8. Convey to CxP and CEV Project decision makers the maturity and validity of analytical 
tools, models, verification status, input data, limitations, uncertainties, and credibility, 
when the results are to be used to support design decisions.  (F-13), {interim R-51}     
R-9. Implement a comprehensive verification plan that is linked to requirements.  Consider 
using statistical DOE techniques for test verification activities to maximize efficient 
resource utilization.  Perform verification activities at the lowest level possible and build 
up to higher levels, to mitigate risks and control external effects.      (F-14, O-4, O-5), 
{interim R-32, R-54}     
9.0 Lessons Learned 
The following Agency lessons learned are identified.  Both are reiterations or enhanced 
restatements of interim Lessons Learned that can be found in original form in Appendices B  
and D: 
LL-1. NASA Programs and Projects should ensure contractor development data is contractually 
required for delivery to the Government, is recorded in Agency documents (e.g., TMs, 
SPs, CMs, etc.), and is stored in Agency searchable databases to assure their availability 
for future programs.  {interim O-23} 
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LL-2. NASA space vehicle development programs with human-rated parachute recovery 
systems should make a single organization fully responsible and accountable for the 
DDI&C of the deceleration and landing systems.  This responsibility should encompass 
all participating subsystems that can affect the reliability of the integrated descent and 
landing system.  (F-15, O-6, O-7), {interim R-9} 
o Such an approach to DDI&C could have utility for other tightly coupled 
spacecraft systems of systems on which crew lives are critically dependant on 
reliable function.   
10.0 Definition of Terms  
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
 
Finding A conclusion based on facts established by the investigating authority.  
 
Lessons Learned Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may 
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap 
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed 
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct; 
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision 
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a 
positive result.  
 
Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the assessment that did 
not contribute to the problem, but if left uncorrected has the potential to 
cause a mishap, injury, or increase the severity should a mishap occur.  
Alternatively, an observation could be a positive acknowledgement of a 
Center/Program/Project/Organization‘s operational structure, tools, and/or 
support provided. 
 
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment. 
 
Proximate Cause  The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed 
immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its 
occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome. 
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Recommendation An action identified by the NESC to correct a root cause or deficiency 
identified during the investigation.  The recommendations may be used by 
the responsible Center/Program/Project/Organization in the preparation of 
a corrective action plan. 
 
Root Cause One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that 
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired 
outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome.  Typically, multiple root causes contribute to an 
undesired outcome. 
11.0 Acronyms List 
ADS Aerodynamic Decelerator System 
AMA Analytical Mechanics Associates, Inc. 
AS Airborne Systems 
ATK Alliant Techsystems, Inc. 
BEI Bay Engineering Innovations  
CEV                        Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CM Crew Module 
CMUS CM Uprighting System 
Con Ops Concept of Operations 
COPV  Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel   
CPAS CEV Parachute Assembly System 
CxP Constellation Program 
CY Calendar Year 
D-Bag Deployment Bag 
DDI&C Design, Development, Integration, and Certification 
DDT&E Design, Development, Testing and Evaluation 
DFMR Design for Minimum Risk 
DOE Design of Experiment 
DOF Degree of Freedom 
DSS Deceleration System Simulation 
EDL Entry, Descent, and Landing 
EE Expert Elicitation 
ELS Earth Landing System 
ELS-FIT Earth Landing System-Functional Integration Team 
EO Experience-based Observations 
ERB Engineering Review Board 
ESCG Engineering and Science Contract Group 
FAQ Frequently Asked Question 
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FBC Forward Bay Cover 
FIT Functional Integration Team 
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FS Factual Statement 
FT Fault Tree 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GFE Government-Furnished Equipment 
GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
GRC Glenn Research Center 
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 
HA Hazard Analysis 
ICD Interface Control Document 
IDAT Integrated Design Assessment Team 
IDR Internal Design Review 
IML Inner Mold Line 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
LAS Launch Abort System 
LaRC Langley Research Center 
LM  Lockheed Martin 
LOC Loss Of Crew 
LRS Landing Recovery System 
MDC Mild Detonating Cord 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
MTSO Management and Technical Support Office 
MVP Master Verification Plan 
NAWS Naval Air Weapons Station 
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NG Northrop Grumman 
NRB NESC Review Board 
NSI NASA Standard Initiator 
NVR Northrop-Ventura Report 
OML Outer Mold Line 
OSIrIS Outdoor Scene and Infrared Image Simulation 
PA Pad Abort 
PDR Preliminary Design Review  
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
PTRS Project Technical Requirements Specification 
PTV Parachute Test Vehicle 
RAESR Risk Assessment Executive Summary Report 
RCS Reaction Control System 
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RP Review Period 
R&R Retention and Release 
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation  
SE&I Systems Engineering and Integration 
S&MA Safety and Mission Assurance 
SRB Solid Rocket Booster 
SSC Stennis Space Center 
SSP Space Shuttle Program 
TBD To Be Decided 
TA Technical Authority 
TPS Thermal Protection System 
U.S. United States 
VA Verification Activities 
V&V Validation and Verification 
VR Verification Requirement 
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